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ABSTRACT
THE REMARKABLE JOHN BIGELOW, JR.: AN EXAMINATION
OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1877-91
Howard K. Hansen, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 1986 
Director: Dr. Carl Boyd
This thesis describes the military career of John Bigelow, 
Jr. , with emphasis on the professional development of United States 
Army officers. It questions the role Bigelow played in the formation 
of army professionalism, a sense of corporate responsibility to 
exercise military expertise correctly. A focus on Bigelow to 
delineate professionalism in the army provides a fresh perspective of 
a pivotal period in American military history in the aftermath of the 
Civil War and before the United States started to build a colonial 
empire. Bigelow articulated a comprehensive concept of total^ar as 
he perceived its development in the United States. He developed a 
doctrine of total war against civilian populations based principally 
on the Civil War campaigns of William Tecumseh Sherman.
This study challenges many assumptions about the development 
of a military ethos within the army after the Civil War. 
Specifically, many military historians suggest that the U.S. Army’s 
isolation on the frontier, away from civilian society, fostered the 
professionalism that flourished during the period. A study of 
Bigelow’s diaries, papers, correspondence, and publications suggests 
instead that a close association with civilians, rather than 
isolation, may have been the catalyst for the development of military 
professionalism.
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PREFACE
John Bigelow, Jr., was a soldier and historian. He toiled 
for over thirty years as an army officer in the Tenth and Ninth 
Regiments, United States Cavalry, rising slowly in rank to Lieutenant 
Colonel. He served on the western frontier in the waning days of the 
army's military operations against the Indians, and was cited for 
gallantry at the Battle of San Juan Hill during the Spanish-Ameriean 
War.
He authored important historical works that helped shape the 
future of the army: reflective monographs of the Franco-Prussian War 
battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte in 1884; a significant study of 
The Principles of Strategy published in 1891 and revised in 1894; and 
an autobiographical critique of the state of the army, Reminiscences 
of the Santiago Campaign, in 1899. During the Geronimo campaign near 
the close of the Indian wars, his published journals did much to 
publicize the unheralded exploits and hardships of the frontier army. 
His most lasting historical contribution was a detailed examination of 
The Campaign of Chancellorsville published in 1910.
This study of the career of Bigelow investigates his role in 
the evolution of American military thought, and determines his 
significance to the professional development of the army. Army 
professionalism should be viewed as a profound sense of corporate 
responsibility to exercise military expertise correctly. Such a
iv
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military professionalism recognizes a social responsibility to provide 
an adequate national defense.
Bigelow is generally given scant attention in histories of 
the United States Army. He has no entry in the authoritative 1984 
edition of the Dictionary of American Military Biography. Although 
his military career from 1873 to 1919 spanned a period of great 
military intellectual development and thought, he is frequently 
overshadowed by his contemporaries Emory Upton, Arthur L. Wagner, and 
Eben Swift. These eminent soldiers staffed the military schools that 
were instituted during the time Bigelow served in the frontier army. 
They ably advanced army professionalism as pioneer military educators. 
Bigelow is unique in that his musing on strategy generally took root 
in the frontier army away from the direct influence of the renaissance 
in the military schools. Overlooked as a progenitor of army 
professionalism, Bigelow should be viewed as one of its leading 
proponents.
What motivated Bigelow? Many military historians suggest 
that the U.S. Army's isolation on the frontier, away from civilian 
society, fostered the professionalism that flourished during the 
latter portion of the nineteenth century; a concentration on Bigelow 
permits a re-evaluation of this terse thesis. Bigelow's career 
suggests instead that a close association with civilians, rather than 
isolation, may have been the catalyst for the military professionalism 
that prevailed during the period.
Most importantly, Bigelow articulated a comprehensive concept 
of total war as he perceived its development in the United States. He
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
codified total war as a strategic principle. Bigelow’s idea of total 
war made an enemy’s population a legitimate target of military action. 
He sought to redirect American military strategy based on principles 
rooted in practical American experience in war. In many respects he 
simply tried to compile a body of strategic principles that the army 
had already been implementing in practice. He articulated a doctrine 
of total war based principally on the Civil War campaigns of William 
Tecumseh Sherman. Clearly, Bigelow represents a very valuable case 
study that should balance an appreciation of soldierly professionalism 
in the classroom, as illustrated mainly by Wagner and Swift, with that 
which developed in the field with the frontier army.
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
JOHN BIGELOW, JR.
Overview
During the Gilded Age of American history, when Mark Twain 
satirized the growing plutocracy within the United States, John 
Bigelow, Jr., appeared to be an enigma. The son of the elder John 
Bigelow, an associate of William Cullen Bryant on the New York Evening 
Post and later President Abraham Lincoln's consul to France during the 
Civil War, he eschewed the life of a scion of a wealthy patriarch, 
opted for a rugged career in the Regular Army, and entered the United 
States Military Academy at West Point on July 1, 1873 •1
Bigelow was a remarkable army officer who had an appreciable 
effect on American military thought. His published journals and 
reminiscences offer startling commentary on the army, and his 
contributions to professional military periodicals stimulated his 
fellow officers. In 1891 he published The Principles of Strategy, a 
w?tershed book that changed the way American army officers viewed 
military history. American military policy, strategy, and tactics had 
been measured based on European examples; Bigelow examined the art of
1U.S., Department of War, Official Army Register for January, 
1879 (Washington, D.C.: Adjutant General's Office, January 1, 1879), 
p. 29.
1
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war in light of American experience. He dispelled the persistent
notion that the professional study of United States military
operations was necessarily inferior to the study of European 
campaigns. Most importantly, Bigelow articulated a comprehensive 
concept of total war as he perceived its development in the United 
States. He discarded the notion that the only legitimate target of 
war was the enemy’s military forces; he proposed that the enemy’s 
civilian population was also a particularly remunerative military 
objective.
In 1910 he published a seminal treatise on The Campaign of 
Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study. Critical
bibliographies laud it as a classic; several decades after its 
publication it was cited as "a masterful study —  one of the very 
finest ever written on an American campaign."2 a contemporary 
reviewer, Eben Swift, Fifth United States Cavalry, one of the 
progenitors of army professionalism and an architect of the officer 
education program, labeled it "a monumental work . . .  at times 
approaching brilliancy.”3 it is still extolled as "the model campaign 
study of the Civil War."1*
2Allan Nevins, James I. Robertson, Jr., and Bell I. Wiley,
eds., Civil War Books; A Critical Bibliography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1967), p. 23; see also Richard J. Sommers, 
"American Military History: The Middle Years, 1815-1916," in A Guide 
to the Study and Use of Military History, eds. John E. Jessup, Jr., 
and Robert W. Coakley (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1979), p. 200.
3Eben Swift, review of The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A 
Strategic and Tactical Study, by John Bigelow, Jr., in American 
Historical Review 16 (January 1911):367.
^Frank E. Vandiver, Forward to Richmond Redeemed: The Siege
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Purpose of the Study
This study examines the diaries, correspondence, and early 
military writings of John Bigelow, Jr., for the purpose of assessing 
his role in the evolution of American military thought and determining 
his significance to the professional development of the army. 
Bigelow’s military career, replete with adventure, boredom, sacrifice, 
and heroism, also offers a helpful window into the larger history of 
the army in 1877-91. Bigelow is indeed an important figure and a 
concentration on his significance to the army near the turn of the 
century is a fruitful intellectual endeavor. Robert M. Utley, in an 
insightful, short pamphlet prepared for the National Park Service, 
Indian. Soldier, and Settler: Experiences in the Struggle for the
American West, suggests that one way to achieve a useful perspective 
of the Indian army is to examine it through the eyes of one 
individual. Utley indicates that historical balance will not be 
realized through a study of the multitude of generals who charted the 
Indian Wars on their maps but rather in the experiences of the 
officers who toiled in the field, often in futile pursuit of hostile 
Indians.5
A biography of Bigelow is useful but this study hopes also to 
question preconceptions about the Indian-fighting army. A number of 
military historians and sociologists have suggested that the army was
at Petersburg, by Richard J. Sommers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & 
Co., 1981), p. vii.
^Robert M. Utley, Indian. Soldier, and Settler; Experiences 
in the Struggle for the American West (St. Louis: Jefferson National
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isolated on the American western frontier during the latter portion of 
the nineteenth century. They contend that the army was physically and 
intellectually insulated from civilian society.® Many military 
historians argue that this isolation fostered the professionalism that 
flourished in the army during the period. These scholars contend that 
isolation severed the army from the mainstream of civilian 
intellectualism and that introspection resulted from necessity and 
produced a unique, independent professionalism apart from developments 
in the civil sector.7 in his 1957 study of The Soldier and the State 
Samuel P. Huntington asserts that isolation was "a prerequisite to 
professionalism."8 An examination of the army career of John Bigelow, 
Jr., provides a fresh perspective of this pivotal period in American 
military history. That examination suggests that army professionalism 
was encouraged by a close association with civilian society rather 
than by isolation.
Precis of Bigelow's Career
U.S. Army officers were not isolated. Bigelow may have 
experienced loneliness and physical isolation in remote frontier 
outposts, but at no time did he feel intellectually separated from the 
mainstream of American thought. Nevertheless, the varied writings of
Expansion Historical Association, 1979), p. 5.
^See, for example, John M. Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of 
U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19th Century," Parameters; Journal of 
the U.S. Army War College 10 (September 1980):32.
7lbid., p. 38.
^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 229, quoted in Gates, "The Alleged 
Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19th Century," p. 32.
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Bigelow’s contemporary military officers support the notion of
isolation. Captain Charles King, for example, was the author of a 
popular series of military stories that vividly depict army life
during the Indian Wars; he highlights the loneliness and travails of
service on the frontier. In an amusing exposition of the Trials of a
Staff Officer published in 1891, he talks of "perilous days on the
Indian frontier . . . ; of out-of-the way sensations in out-of-the way 
garrisons . . . ; [and of a] life more or less monotonous."9 Even
Bigelow’s own letters and journals frequently reinforce this
misleading perspective. John M. Gates, in an intriguing article on
"The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19th
Century,” states this perspective is a popular cliche generated by the 
officers' own "tendency toward the creation of a self-contained social 
world on their military posts."10 Gates discards the notion of
isolation.
Although the concept of isolation may be a convenient
generalization that helps explain the surge of professionalism that
appeared throughout the army, a review of Bigelow’s military
incumbency belies such a thesis. Bigelow was indeed assigned to
remote outposts on the frontier and overseas in the course of his
extended military service, but he was by no means cut off from
society; he was also afforded duties that placed him in close contact 
with civilians. It can be argued that Bigelow’s professional musing
^Charles King, Trials of a Staff Officer (Philadelphia: L. R. 
Hamersly & Co., 1891), p. 5.
^Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 37.
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on strategy, tactics, and the state of the army arose from his 
intimate interaction with civilian society rather than his isolation 
in secluded military garrisons. Even arduous assignments proffered 
surprising intellectual stimulation and interaction with local 
civilians. For example, at Fort Davis, Texas, during the army's 
pursuit of Geronimo in 1885, Bigelow not only honed his Spanish skills 
with local Mexican residents but delivered historical dissertations to 
nearby literary clubs and submitted articles to newspapers in major 
western cities.11 Less rugged duty as an assistant professor of 
French and an assistant instructor of tactics at West Point in 1880-84 
afforded more frequent and traditional opportunities for association 
with civilians.12 Bigelow discussed tactics and history with visiting 
dignitaries, read papers before military history forums, and published 
commentary on current military events.13
11John Bigelow, Jr., to Jane Poultney Bigelow, 3 March 1885, 
The Papers of John Bigelow, box 96, Rare Books and Manuscripts
Division, New York Public Library (NYPL). Jane Poultney Bigelow was 
Bigelow’s mother. See also The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 16 
February 1885, John Bigelow, Jr., Papers, United States Military
Academy (USMA) Library. In addition, Mrs. Orsemus B. Boyd, Cavalry 
Life in Tent and Field (New York: J. S. Tait, 1894; reprint ed.,
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 303 suggests that it
was not unusual for officers stationed on the frontier to deliver
lectures and addresses to local civic and church groups, or other 
social and club meetings.
12See Major General George W. Cullura, Biographical Register 
of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, at West 
Point. N.Y. from its Establishment, in 1802. to 1890: With the Early 
History of the United States Military Academy. 3rd ed., 3 vols. 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1891), 3:285. During subsequent 
decades, various editors have added other volumes and supplements to 
Cullum's register; these will be cited separately, as appropriate, in 
the course of this study.
13see, for example, The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 27 May 
1884 and 3 June 1884, USMA; also John Bigelow, Jr., Mars-la-Tour and
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In 1887 Bigelow was posted to Washington, D.C., in the 
Adjutant General's Office, a position that Gates suggests provided "an 
astonishing array of opportunities for the integration of army 
officers into American civilian and political life."11* Indeed, for 
this very reason Bigelow considered his tour of duty in the nation’s 
capital most profitable, at the time his "best ever in the army."15 
It was certainly a tumultuous historical period for the War Department 
staff, and Bigelow found himself witness to the struggle for dominance 
between the Commanding General of the Army and the Adjutant General. 
Bigelow maintained close association with civilians during additional 
duty in charge of the Washington Recruiting Rendezvous in 1889.1®
Bigelow was assigned in 1894 as a professor of military 
science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he taught 
until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Gates says that such 
an assignment "provided some of the best opportunities for officers to 
involve themselves in civilian activities."17 It was not an atypical
Gravelotte (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884), pp. 1 
and 25.
1l*Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 36.
15john Bigelow, Jr., to Jane Poultney Bigelow, 13 September 
1887, box 96, NYPL.
16Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates 
of the U.S. Military Academy. 3:285.
17Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 35. The assignment to the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in the summer of 1894 led directly to 
Bigelow's publication of The Campaign of Chancellorsville. Bigelow 
indicates in the Preface to The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A 
Strategic and Tactical Study (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1910), p. xi, that he "selected the campaign of Chancellorsville as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assignment. Gates found that more than 30 percent of Bigelow’s peers 
experienced similar duties in academe.1® After the war Bigelow was 
assigned for a short time as collector of customs at Sagua la Grande, 
Cuba.19 That too was a task that demanded intimate association with 
civilians. It was one of several assignments that demanded the 
employment of essentially civilian rather than military skills. 
Similarly, from 1899 until 1902, he also investigated Spanish war 
claims.
The latter portion of Bigelow’s military career was also 
notable for the assignments that brought him into close contact with 
civilians, often in direct service to civil needs. In 1904, for 
example, Bigelow was acting superintendent of Yosemite National Park 
where he was charged with policing the nature reserve, establishing 
and enforcing the government's conservation policies, and preserving 
and protecting the park ecology.20 Later, from 1906 to 1910, he was
the theme for a course of lectures to my classes.” He presented other 
outstanding campaign studies to his students as well, particularly a 
series on the campaign of Saratoga; see John Bigelow, Jr., "The 
Campaign of Saratoga, 1777: A Strategic Study," in The Colonel John 
Bigelow Papers, box 3, series 1, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
1®Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 35.
19Edward S. Holden, ed., Biographical Register of the 
Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. New 
York Since its Establishment in 1802. by Major General George W. 
Cullum, Supplement, vol. 4: 1890-1900 (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside
Press, 1901), p. 287.
20See, for example, Richard A. Bartlett, "The Army, 
Conservation, and Ecology: The National Park Assignment," in The
United States Army in Peacetime: Essays in Honor of the Bicentennial. 
1775-1975. eds. Robin Higham and Carol Brandt (Manhattan, Kan3,: 
Military Affairs/Aerospace Historical Publishing, 1975), p. 41.
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on duty with the organized militia of Massachusettes; he was again 
appointed a professor of military science, this time at Rutgers 
college during 1917 to 1918; and during the First World War he 
returned to Washington, D.C., to close his career with an assignment 
to the historical section of the U.S. Army general staff.21
It is important to highlight Bigelow’s terminal military 
assignment with the historical section, for it underscores the 
historical slight imposed on Bigelow. Although modern historians 
generally ignore his influence on the army, Bigelow’s contemporaries 
recognized his intellectual mastery of the realities of war. Army 
chief of staff Major General Leonard Wood took the initial steps to 
establish a historical section of the army general staff in January 
1914. Wood knew that several foreign armies had maintained historical 
sections for a number of years and he queried American military 
attaches to report on their organization and functions. Although Wood 
contemplated forming an American historical section and Bigelow was 
considered for assignment, nothing was done until January 1918. Then 
the new army chief of staff, General Tasker H. Bliss, finally directed 
the establishment of a historical staff. He sought the best qualified 
officers to pioneer the effort, and Bigelow was one of five 
selected.22 They initially developed independent historical
21Wirt Robinson, ed., Biographical Register of the Officers 
and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York 
Since its Establishment in 1802, by Major General George W. Cullum, 
Supplement, vol. 5: 1910-1920 (Saginaw, Mich.: Seemann & Peters,
Printers, 1920), pp. 239-40.
22Joseph Mills Hanson, "The Historical Section, Army War 
College," The Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1 
(Summer 1937):70-71.
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monographs. Later, however, the staff was eventually enlarged to 
eighty persons and began systematically to exploit the reports of the 
American Expeditionary Forces.
Proposition
Bigelow is a neglected historical figure. He should be 
considered in any thorough evaluation of the development of the United 
States Army. Only Russell F. Weigley, in his insightful survey of 
American military thought, Towards an American Army: Military Thought
from Washington to Marshall, assigns Bigelow a prominent position in 
the evolution of army professionalism.23 Few other serious writers on 
the subject acknowledge Bigelow. Timothy K. Nenninger, in a concise 
study of The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army; Education, 
Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 
1881-1918. notes Bigelow only in a passing reference.21* His absence
23Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army; Military 
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962), pp. 93-99. Other major works by Weigley also contain 
discussions of Bigelow's contribution to American military thought, 
but the chapter entitled "William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant: 
The Rise of Total War" in Towards an American Army is a more 
comprehensive treatment. See also Weigley's History of the United 
States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), p. 274 and The 
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), particularly pp. 
192-97 and 502. Weigley's essay, "American Strategy from Its 
Beginnings Through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers 
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 408-43 also includes a 
consideration of Bigelow and continues Weigley's earlier analysis of 
Bigelow's The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American 
Campaigns. 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1894).
2l*Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old 
Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United 
States Army. 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from the Dictionary of American Military Biography, therefore, is not 
surprising; the editors have established narrow criteria for 
inclusion, and Bigelow is overlooked in favor of well-studied pioneer 
military educators, particularly his contemporaries, Emory Dpton, 
Arthur L. Wagner, and Eben Swift.25 John G. Bourke, Charles King, and 
Charles B. Gatewood, other prominent contemporaries of Bigelow, are 
also excluded despite notable accomplishments that also fail to 
attract the attention of many scholars.
The Indian army was adept at small unit tactics, and the 
officer corps was concerned with the command and supply of widely 
scattered detachments. The schools of military application that were 
instituted during the period taught tactics exclusively, and the
p. 82. Other important surveys of the development of army 
professionalism include C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, 
American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, Pa.: 
Stackpole Co., 1955); William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the 
United States Army (D. Appleton-Century Co., 19*12; reprint ed., 
Ashton, Md.: Eric Lundberg, 1964); Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A 
Study in American Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1956); and T. Harry Williams, Americans at War: The Development of the 
American Military System (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1960). John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History 
and Learning," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (Winter 
1971):205-28, reprinted in Shy's A People Numerous and Armed: 
Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 225-54 is a provocative and 
pertinent essay. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, and Morris 
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait 
(New York: Free Press, 1960) are the standard works on army
professionalism.
25Roger J. Spiller, ed., Dictionary of American Military 
Biography, associate ed. Joseph G. Dawson III, consulting ed. T. 
Harry Williams, 3 vols. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 
1:ix. An extensive winnowing process was required to determine the 
biographies that would eventually be included in the dictionary, and 
many deletions occasioned much consternation on the part of 
contributors.
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principal instructors wrote useful textbooks that were used in the 
classroom and throughout the army.26 Strategy was ignored. Wagner 
was the most prominent instructor and tactician and his major 
examinations of The Service of Security and Information in 1893 and 
Organization and Tactics in 1895 were influential studies of European 
tactical developments. Bigelow was practically alone in considering 
the role of the army in a major war, and the only officer to address 
strategy instead of tactics.27
Huntington indicates in his examination of The Soldier and 
the State that his theory on the slow evolution of professionalism in 
the United States Army demands historical generalization and 
simplification to form a coherent model for study.28 Conversely, a 
narrow focus on Bigelow cannot be a comprehensive refutation of such a 
scholarly hypothesis. Nevertheless, it certainly questions the 
commonly accepted view of Huntington that isolation necessarily led to 
professionalism.
26wiiiiams, Americans at War, p. 92.
27weigley, "American Strategy “rom Its Beginnings Through the 
First World War," p. 439.
28Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. vii.
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CHAPTER II
ON THE FRONTIER: THE EARLY MILITARY 
CAREER OF JOHN BIGELOW, JR.
A West Point Student
Bigelow's choice of a military life was not as startling as 
it might at first seem. The army provided Bigelow a prestige 
commensurate with his upper class grooming. The corps of cadets at 
West Point, for example, was comprised principally of middle- and 
upper-class young men.1 His father prized the trappings of a formal 
education, and the military academy offered tangible certification of 
scientific training. Further, Bigelow's upbringing attracted him to 
American army officers who were accustomed to national and 
international affairs.2 Bigelow was also inspired by his father's 
zeal for national service and he tried unsuccessfully to secure 
President Ulysses S. Grant's appointment to West Point in 1870. Grant 
refused, citing a disposition only to appoint the sons of veterans. 
This inclination greatly irritated Bigelow's father who had served
1Colonel Charles W. Larned, "The Genius of West Point," in 
The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 
New York, 1802-1902. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1904), 1:482-83.
2see John M. Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army 
Officers in the Late 19th Century," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. 
Army War College 10 (September 1980):36.
13
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Lincoln admirably during the war in the diplomatic service.3 He 
eventually secured a congressional appointment and was assigned in 
1873 from Hew York, where his father was active in politics. His 
father was a renowned man of letters and young Bigelow had been the 
beneficiary of a liberal education prior to his appointment. He 
attended schools in Paris, while his father was consul, and in Bonn, 
Berlin, and Freiberg, Germany.1* Bigelow was an unlikely candidate for 
the unintellectual life that appeared to await him on the American 
western frontier; the army had been engaged in seemingly unending 
campaigns against the Indians since the end of the Civil War.
Why, then, was Bigelow attracted to the army? It is likely 
he was stimulated by an admiration of German military might in the 
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71; as a student in Germany he was impressed 
by the newspaper accounts of Prussian victories, and interviewed many 
of the French prisoners interned near Berlin.5 He was appalled by the
3Margaret Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), p. 273. Interestingly, Bigelow 
was finally appointed to the military academy by Lyman Tremain, a 
congressman from Albany although neither Bigelow nor his father knew 
him. Nevertheless, young Bigelow was sponsored by West Point 
professor Peter Smith Michie. See John Bigelow, Retrospections of an 
Active Life, 5 vols. (New York: Baker 4 Taylor Co., vols. 1-3, 1909), 
and (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page 4 Co., vols. 4-5, ed. John 
Bigelow, Jr., 1913), 5:347.
^National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 35 (Clifton, 
N.J.: James T. White 4 Co., 1949), p. 319; see also Sixty-Seventh 
Annual Report of the Association of Graduates of the United States 
Military Academy at West Point. New York, June 11. 1936 (Newburg, 
N.Y.: Moore Publishing Co., 1936), p. 103•
^Poultney Bigelow, Seventy Summers. 2 vols. (New York:
Longman’s, Green 4 Co., 1925), 1:65; see also Poultney Bigelow,
Prussian Memories: 1864-1914 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), p. 
38. Poultney Bigelow, author and adventurer, was Bigelow’s brother.
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unpreparedness of France and sought reasons for the German victory. 
The French debacle similarly convinced his father that the United
States should make na knowledge of the arts of war a part of every
young man's education."6 Bigelow decided to pursue this knowledge at 
West Point.
General William Tecumseh Sherman, Commanding General of the 
Army, was also affected by the success of the German military system 
and was attempting to invigorate the officer corps of the army through 
the professional study of war.7 Bigelow was attracted by the changes 
tendered by Sherman's leadership. He was surely apprised of army
reforms since the family estate was in Highland Falls, near West 
Point. He was disappointed not to undertake his military study with 
Dennis Hart Mahan, who died in 1871.
Mahan had a pervasive impact on the army. He had been
teaching at West Point since 1824. His manifesto on war, An 
Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard. Out-Post. and Detachment 
Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in 
Presence of an Enemy, was published in 1847; it was more commonly 
known as Out-Post and was an official text at the academy for many 
years. It buttressed the principles of Antoine Henri de Jomini's
^Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen, p. 268. Also, in a letter 
from John Bigelow to William Allen Butler, 14 November 1870, the elder 
Bigelow argues for compulsory military education based on his views 
and observations during the Franco-Prussian War; cited in Bigelow, 
Retrospections of an Active Life. 5:429-34.
^Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old 
Army: Education. Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United 
States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 
22.
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Summary of the Art of War and served to delimit the way army officers 
defined warfare.® The leadership of the army was nurtured on Mahan’s 
lectures at West Point and persuaded by his book. He perpetuated a 
Jominian offensive policy aimed at the seizure of territory; Bigelow 
would come to believe it was a tenet that endured beyond its 
usefulness.9 Bigelow would devote much of his early career to an 
intellectual attempt to overturn this orientation.
When Bigelow entered the academy in the summer of 1873, West 
Point under Superintendent Thomas H. Ruger offered no curriculum to 
promote advanced military study.10 General Sherman’s authority as 
commanding general did not extend to West Point, and the academy was 
not affected by his zeal to investigate the future of warfare.11 The 
program of instruction emphasized mathematics. Bigelow was 
disappointed. Nevertheless, the commandant of cadets during Bigelow's 
initial year at the academy was Emory Upton, who had authored the 
army's manual of infantry tactics and later compiled such studies as 
The Military Policy of the United States, and The Armies of Asia and
®Edward S. Holden and W. L. Ostrander, "A Tentative List of 
Textbooks Used in the United States Military Academy at West Point 
from 1802 to 1902," in The Centennial of the United States Military 
Academy. 1:464.
9Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962), p. 47.
10Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), p. 272; See also William 
Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (D. Appleton- 
Century Co., 1942; reprint ed., Ashton, Md.: Eric Lundberg, 1964), p. 
542.
11Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 273.
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Europe. Upton engaged the cadets in lively discussions of the art of 
war. Upton was the principal instructor of tactics until his 
departure during the summer in 1874, but his young assistants
continued to assemble frequently at the Bigelow home in Highland
Falls.12 Bigelow compensated for the academy’s lack of a formal
professional program for the study of war by debating with these 
instructors and his fellow cadets. Carl von Clausewitz’s classic On 
War was first published in English in 1873, and it was likely a
frequent topic at such gatherings.13
Much of Bigelow’s education at West Point was marked by his
own efforts to bolster his studies. For example, in a letter to his
father in October 1876, young Bigelow indicated he was enjoying his 
classes in international law, particularly his study of historical 
examples. These examples, however, were provided by the elder Bigelow 
in copies of diplomatic correspondence he had provided to his son.11*
U.S. Army Tenth Regiment of Cavalry
Bigelow persisted through four years of the military
academy’s constricting curriculum, but he did not excel in the rigid,
mechanical approach to war. Indeed, the Official Register of the
Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy. West Point. N.Y..
120. L. Hein, Memories of Long Ago by an Old Army Officer
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 105.
13see, for example, Weigley, History of the United States
Army, p. 273.
1l*John Bigelow, Jr., to John Bigelow, 16 October 1876, The 
Papers of John Bigelow, box 96, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, 
New York Public Library (NYPL).
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June. 1877 indicates that young Bigelow did very poorly in tactics; he 
managed to accumulate only 42.9 out of a possible 100 merit points for 
graduation.15 He preferred a historical study of war rather than West 
Point's abstract emphasis on weapons and tactics. Bigelow noted that 
West Point training instilled an excessive appreciation of science. 
He lamented the fact that Upton was considered ordinary, simply 
because he was not scientific.^ He graduated on June 14, 1877, but 
ranked only 46 in a class of 76 cadets. 17 Nevertheless, he was a 
Cadet Lieutenant, a position normally garnered by students who 
excelled, particularly in tactics.1® He was commissioned as a Second 
Lieutenant and joined the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry, Company B, on 
frontier duty at Fort Duncan, Texas.19 The Tenth Regiment was one of 
the army's two black cavalry regiments, organized under a 
congressional act of July 2 8, 1866 .20
^Headquarters, U.S. Military Academy, Official Register of 
the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy. West Point. 
N.Y.. June. 1877. June 30, 1877, p. 29.
1^The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 25 May 1884, John 
Bigelow, Jr., Papers, United States Military Academy (USMA) Library.
I^Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of 
the United States Army. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1903), 1:217.
Inofficial Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. 
Military Academy, p. 34.
19Major General George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of 
the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, at West 
Point. N.Y. from its Establishment, in 1802. to 1890: With the Early 
History of the United States Military Academy. 3rd ed., 3 vols. 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1891), 35 285.
20john Bigelow, Jr., "The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry," in 
Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, vol. 3: 
Freedom and Jim Crow. 1865-1917. ed. Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard
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The regiment was commanded by white officers, and Bigelow’s 
assignment may have been due to his low ranking in class; many 
officers were particularly disagreeable to duty with the black 
regiments.21 Higher ranking graduates traditionally chose the Corps 
of Engineers and the artillery b r a n c h . 22 Only 46 of the graduates 
were appointed to vacancies in the individual arms of service; the 
remaining 30 cadets were appointed as Additional Second Lieutenants to 
be promoted to vacancies as they occurred in the arms. The top three 
cadets were appointed to the Corps of Engineers, and twelve of the 
next thirteen graduates were posted to artillery positions. Cadet 
John J. Haden, who graduated tenth in the class, opted for the Eighth
C. Nalty (Willmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1977), p. 29.
Bigelow is frequently cited as the principal historical biographer of 
the Tenth Cavalry, and John M. Carroll refers to him as such in the 
Introduction to Major E. L. N. Glass, The History of the Tenth 
Cavalry. 1866-1921 (Tucson: Acme Printing Co., 1921; reprint ed., Ft. 
Collins, Colo.: Old Army Press, 1972), p. iii. Bigelow's historical
overview of the regiment was originally prepared for the Journal of 
the Military Service Institution as part of a series of historical 
sketches of the D.S. Army. It was published in a shortened form in 
January 1892; the full manuscript was incorporated into the records of 
the regiment.
21john M. Carroll, ed., The Black Military Experience in the 
American West (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1971), p. 
260; see also Jack C. Gale, "Lebo in Pursuit,” Journal of Arizona 
History 21 (Spring 1980):13. Gale cites an advertisement in the Army
and Navy Journal. June 10, 1871: "A First Lieutenant of Infantry
(white) stationed at a very desirable post in the Department of the 
South desires a transfer with an officer of the same grade, on equal 
terms if in a white regiment, but if in a colored regiment, a 
reasonable bonus would be expected."
22see, for example, Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy 
from Its Beginnings Through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., 
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelll to the Nuclear Age
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 416; also Mrs. 
Orsemus B. Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field (New York: J. S.
Tait, 1894; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1982), p. 18.
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Regiment of Infantry, probably to secure an immediate vacancy in the 
active service.23 The cadets who graduated eleventh through sixteenth 
and selected the artillery were designated as Additional Second 
Lieutenants and awaited vacancies in the active force. Although the 
remainder of the class appears to have selected between the cavalry or 
infantry in no discernible pattern, few appear actively to have sought 
assignment to the black regiments.24 The black Ninth Cavalry acquired 
graduates who ranked between 40-54 in the class; the Tenth Cavalry 
received cadets who generally ranged in merit from 43-61, although 
Cadet Calvin C. Esterly, who ranked 27 went to the Tenth, as did Henry 
0. Flipper, who ranked 49 and was the only black graduate.25 The two 
black infantry regiments were assigned cadets who graduated between 
44-58 in the class.26 Bigelow’s father cautioned him to approach his 
assignment to a black unit without prejudice.2? A review of his 
private correspondence indicates young Bigelow was quite liberal in 
his attitude towards blacks, a progressive stance that belied his 
Victorian background. Bigelow’s experience as a cadet with Flipper
23u.S., Department of War, General Orders No. 61, Adjutant 
General's Office, Washington, D.C., June 27, 1877.
2^Ibid.
25During Bigelow's tenure as a student at West Point he 
observed the academy’s struggle to cope with the admission of black 
cadets. Flipper was a classmate and the first black to graduate from 
the military academy. Flipper endured prejudice and ostracism at West 
Point only to be court-martialed and dismissed from the army in 1882 
for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
26u.S., Department of War, General Orders No. 61.
27john Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 8 January 1878, box 12,
NYPL.
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may have also better prepared him for this initial duty with black 
troops.
The Tenth Cavalry in Texas 
During the next two years Bigelow withstood the stultifying 
effects of scouting with the black "buffalo soldiers" in west Texas. 
Colonel Benjamin Grierson, commander of the black cavalry regiment, 
was charged with subduing the hostile Comanche Indians in the region. 
Grierson was a former music teacher who had served admirably in the 
Onion army during the Civil War. He kept the troopers of his regiment 
patrolling in the field to guard against the hit-and-run tactics of 
the C o m a n c h e s . 2 8  Bigelow also was on the move, scouting out of Fort 
Duncan and Fort Stockton and commanding Fort Pulaski, an outpost on 
the Rio Grande R i v e r . 2 9  Bigelow’s tenure with the Tenth Cavalry in
28william H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers; A Narrative of the 
Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1967), p. 169. Indians called the black troopers of the Ninth and
Tenth Cavalry Regiments "buffalo soldiers" because their hair
resembled that of the buffalo. Leckie indicates that "the buffalo was 
a sacred animal to the Indian, and it is unlikely that he would so 
name an enemy if respect were lacking." The black soldiers understood 
this and proudly embraced the title.
29john Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 29 January 1878, box 12, 
NYPL. Although correspondence indicates Bigelow commanded Fort 
Pulaski during part of his initial tour with the Tenth Cavalry, it
does not appear in an official inventory of army outposts. See U.S., 
Department of War, List of Military Posts. Etc.. Established in the 
United States from its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time 
(Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1902). It presents a list of forts, named camps, redoubts,
reservations, general hospitals, national cemeteries, etc., 
established or erected in the United States. The list was compiled by 
the Adjutant General's Returns Division as of February 1, 1902.
Nonetheless, Bigelow’s correspondence is likely correct. Boyd 
indicates in Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, p. 285, that company 
officers were frequently dispatched to numerous temporary garrisons 
scattered along the Rio Grande River. Fort Pulaski might likely have
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west Texas spanned a proud chapter in the history of the regiment, and 
Bigelow quickly grew proud of his black troopers. Grierson’s command 
not only fought the restive Comanches but also disgruntled Mexican 
Indians who raided across the border. Mexican bandits and 
revolutionaries also conducted forays into American territory, and the 
"buffalo soldiers" were expected to maintain the peace along the vast 
expanse of the border. To do so they were frequently permitted to 
continue pursuits into Mexico in order to attack their varied enemies 
in mountain sanctuaries.
Bigelow was in the field most of the time, although he rarely 
experienced combat. It was not unusual for the army on the frontier 
to be in the field at least half of the the time. Since 1869 Congress 
had limited the regular army to a strength of 25,000 men. With a 
large contingent of troops required for Reconstruction service and to 
man coastal fortifications, troops detailed to the frontier were 
stretched beyond the limits of their effectiveness. As a result, the 
Tenth Cavalry was required to patrol a large geographic area with 
insufficient troops.30 Grierson's Tenth Cavalry Regiment had an 
authorized strength of 1,202 soldiers, but when Bigelow joined the 
regiment, fewer than 900 men were available for duty. 31 It
been a small camp of short permanence that served the various cavalry 
detachments patrolling the region. See also Edward M. Coffman, "Army 
Life on the Frontier, 1865-1898," Military Affairs: Journal of the
American Military Institute 20 (Winter 1956):193. Coffman reports 
that temporary camps were frequently "hastily erected due to necessity 
and abandoned" quickly when their usefulness had ended.
30Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The 
Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 214.
31Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 152.
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exacerbated a difficult situation. Scouting was a critical 
responsibility of the frontier army in order to keep potentially 
hostile Indians under surveillance; to police the vast territory to 
protect settlers, miners, and other citizens; and to locate warring 
Indian b a n d s . 32 a cavalry scouting party usually consisted of only an 
officer, ten troops, and some Indian scouts. Records indicate that 
Bigelow was in command of such a detachment from Troop B near 
Escondido Station, Texas, on April 15, 1878 when they engaged a
hostile Indian band.33 One citizen was killed.
Despite the continual patrols, Bigelow experienced the long 
hours of tedium that scholars suggest characterized duty on the 
western frontier.34 in an interesting letter to one of his sisters, 
Annie, from San Antonio in August 1879, Bigelow complained of the 
isolation.35 He grumbled that civilians did not like the army. 
Nevertheless, despite this impression of alienation from the
32Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, p. 270.
33George W. Webb, Chronological List of Engagements Between 
the Regular Army of the United States and Various Tribes of Hostile 
Indians which Occurred During the Years 1790 to 1898, Inclusive (St. 
Joseph, Mo.: Wing Print and Publishing Co., 1939; reprint ed. New 
York: AMS Press, 1976), p. 82.
3^See, for example, Weigley, History of the Onited States 
Army, p. 272; see also Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United 
States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Co., 1973), P* 68. Gale, "Lebo in Pursuit," p. 13, indicates "the 
daily tedium and monotony drove many an officer and enlisted man to 
drink or in some cases, insanity." He notes, however, that "a few 
officers found relief from the boredom by becoming part-time 
ethnologists while others took up writing to supplement their meager 
pay and fight the long dull days." He mentions particularly Bigelow 
and John G. Bourke as examples of the latter.
35john Bigelow, Jr., to Annie Bigelow, 14 August 1879, box
96, NYPL.
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surrounding civilian population, Bigelow offered the explanation that 
the exclusiveness of army society might account for the apparent lack 
of civilian cordiality.
Although Bigelow's introduction to army life was indeed 
spartan, his alleged isolation on the frontier was not without 
diversion. Besides dealing with the Comanches, the Tenth Regiment had 
other responsibilities that included protecting mail routes, railroads 
and telegraph lines, roadbuilding, and mapping.36 On an extended 
scouting expedition, for example, Bigelow mapped a region near Tucson, 
Arizona, and a mountain in the Santa Rita range was named for him.37 
During periods of inactivity it was not unusual for Bigelow and his 
fellow bachelor officers to escort ladies from nearby Fort Duncan to 
see the sights in the Mexican border towns.38 The Mexican town of 
Piedras Negras was just across the border from Fort Duncan. Mrs. 
Orsemus B. Boyd, in her intimate account of the army in the west, 
Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, recounts enjoyable excursions to the
36see, for example, Jack D. Foner, "The Socializing Role of 
the Military," in The American Military on the Frontier. The 
Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United States Air 
Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976, ed. James P. Tate 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 86; see also
Gale, "Lebo in Pursuit," p. 15. Captain Thomas C. Lebo was a company 
commander in the Tenth Cavalry and Bigelow was his second in command 
during much of the unit's service on the western frontier. Gale 
indicates that mapping "mountain ranges, passes, desert flats, springs 
and water holes" became a major undertaking for the company during the 
period the Tenth Cavalry spent in west Texas.
37will C. Barnes, Secretary, United States Geographic Board, 
to John Bigelow, Jr., 25 June 1930, box 17, USMA.
38see, for example, the Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 21 
December 1877, USMA cited in Edward M. Coffman, The Young Officer in 
the Old Army. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, no. 18 
(Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Academy, 1976), p. 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
quaint town. Fiestas and bullfights were particularly enjoyable for 
the members of the garrison, and the officers were also frequently 
invited to balls hosted by the nearby Mexican military.39 At other 
times Bigelow would hunt outside the fort.1*0 Mostly, however, to 
compensate for the lack of entertainment he occupied his time reading 
German military works on the Franco-Prussian War.
Despite the seemingly apparent isolation, Bigelow was very 
much affected by events and developments beyond the confines of his 
routine military responsibilities.1̂  His father, for example, had 
been intimately involved in the heated and disputed presidential 
election of 1876. The elder Bigelow helped manage the apparently 
successful campaign of Samuel J. Tilden, which led to the extended 
electoral controversary that eventually saw Rutherford B. Hayes 
inaugurated president.^2 The senior Bigelow remained active in 
national politics and in 1884 was involved in the election of Grover 
Cleveland. He kept his young son fully informed in detailed 
correspondence. In addition, Bigelow was affected by the new ideas 
and technologies that necessarily expanded expectations in all sectors 
of society, including the military.**3 The inventions of Thomas
39soyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, pp. 290-91.
^John Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 20 January 1878, box 12,
NYPL.
111Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 39.
^Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen, p. 283.
^Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 40.
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Edison, advancement of electrification, increasing availability of 
telephones, and the growth of industry, for example, combined to 
stimulate an overall philosophical evaluation of life in America. The 
United States Army was similarly influenced by the Industrial 
Revolution and technological developments, and Bigelow questioned 
their effect on the role of the military.
Bigelow began to understand the influence of new and improved 
weaponry and transport on the conduct of war, lessons gleaned from his 
study of the Franco-Prussian War. The most profound impact on Bigelow 
was a broadened world-view that recognized the relative military 
inferiority of the United States.^ The example of the unpreparedness 
and failure of the French military in the Franco-Prussian War offered 
Bigelow stark lessons that could be applied to his own army. He 
studied the conflict in detail. His father forwarded to Texas much 
original material on the Franco-Prussian War, including official 
reports, and young Bigelow busied himself preparing a monograph on the
conflict.45
^Jamie W. Moore, "National Security in the American Army’s 
Definition of Mission, 1865-1914," Military Affairs 46 (October 
1982):129.
^See, for example, John Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 22 
September 1877, 11 March 1878, 13 August 1878, and 7 Novemebr 1878, 
box 12, NYPL.
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CHAPTER III
MARS-LA-TOUR AND GRAVELOTTE: JOHN BIGELOW, JR., 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF ARMY PROFESSIONALISM
Professional Education and the Officer Corps 
By 1880 General Sherman's plans to enhance the professional 
education of army officers were beginning to be realized. He had 
installed Emory Opton as commandant of the artillery school at Fort 
Monroe and directed that the course of instruction include military 
history, strategy, and logistics.^ Major General Winfield Scott 
Hancock founded the Military Service Institute of the United States in 
1878, and in 1879 its journal began publication.2 In January 1880,
when Bigelow was assigned to West Point as an assistant professor of 
French and an assistant instructor of tactics, Major General John M. 
Schofield was superintendent of the academy.3 Schofield had been
^Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old 
Army: Education. Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United 
States Army. 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 
22.
^Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), p. 542.
3Major General George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the 
Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, at West Point, 
N.Y. from its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890: With the Early History 
of the United States Military Academy, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1891), 3:285; and William Addleman Ganoe, The 
History of the United States Army (D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942; 
reprint ed., Ashton, Md.: Eric Lundberg, 1964), p. 542.
27
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dispatched to be superintendent at West Point, to replace Colonel 
Ruger, at the personal behest of Sherman. Sherman wished to extend 
his influence over the academy and he believed Schofield would 
assist.1* Schofield obligingly felt the need to attract talented 
officers to West Point, and Bigelow appeared promising.
Bigelow’s flair for languages was known by Schofield, but the 
superintendent might also have been attracted by Bigelow's interest in 
military history. Schofield had a keen interest in military history 
and was drawn to officers of a similar ilk. He had superseded Ruger 
as superintendent of the academy in 1876, prior to Bigelow's 
graduation in 1877, and the general was certainly familiar with 
Bigelow's interest in the historical study of warfare. The general 
might also have been aware of Bigelow's draft treatise on the Franco- 
Prussian War.
Bigelow was in the vanguard of the new professionalism and 
fulfilled whatever hopes Schofield harbored. Bigelow refined his 
study of the Franco-Prussian War and presented a paper on the battle 
of Mars-la-Tour to the Military Service Institute on November 26, 
1880.5 Later, on December 21 and 29, 1882, and January 8, 1883, he 
presented another study on the battle of Gravelotte.6 These detailed 
reports were published as a monograph by the Ordnance Department in 
January 1884. Bigelow also published several articles on current
^Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the 
Army (New York: Century Co., 1897), p. 443.
5john Bigelow, Jr., Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884), p. 1.
6Ibid., p. 25.
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military affairs. Great Britain, for example, was embroiled in 
colonial wars in Africa, and Bigelow issued commentary on Eqypt and 
the Sudan and General Charles Gordon’s expedition to Khartoum.7 He 
was an inveterate student of military affairs.
Bigelow was an asset to the academy. He had a facility for 
languages and was clearly needed as an instructor in French. The 
French department at the academy was particularly weak; many of the 
instructors could not even speak the language. Thomas J. Fleming, in 
a survey of West Point: The Men and Times of the United States 
Military Academy, reports that the generally inefficient French 
instructors would conveniently disappear whenever a French dignitary 
visited.® Schofield, however, knew Bigelow had been educated in 
Europe in French and German schools prior to his appointment as a 
cadet at West Point. Schofield, a friend of Bigelow's father, was 
dispatched to the American embassy in Paris by Secretary of State 
William H. Stewart while the elder Bigelow was consul.9 He was
certainly familiar with Lieutenant Bigelow’s fluency in French.
While Bigelow was an instructor at the military academy, the 
Department of the French Language merged with the Spanish department 
in June 1882 to form a Department of Modern Languages, and Bigelow
?The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 25 June 1884 and 11
October 1884, John Bigelow, Jr., Papers, United States Military 
Academy (USMA) Library.
®Thomas J. Fleming, West Point: The Men and Times of the
United States Military Academy (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1969),
p. 236.
^Margaret Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow
(Boston: Little, Brown A Co., 1947), p. 252; see also Schofield, 
Forty-Six Years in the Army, pp. 382 and 392.
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also conducted classes in Spanish studies.1*1 Bigelow had particularly 
enjoyed the study of Spanish when he was a student at the academy, and 
the merger permitted him to continue his interest.11 He had sharpened 
his Spanish language skills while on duty with the Tenth Cavalry along 
the Mexican border. A Spanish grammar book frequently accompanied him 
on patrols.12 He enjoyed the study of languages. Although Bigelow 
later headed the French department at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and published a French grammar in 1906, at this early stage 
of his career he pursued his interest in languages as a hobby.13
Bigelow's rich literary patrimony also qualified him for 
other responsibilities. Besides his father's credentials as a 
journalist, writer, and essayist, his brother, Poultney Bigelow, was a 
journalist, and Schofield needed Bigelow to drill cadets in English.111
1®Edward E. Wood, "Historical Sketch of the Department of 
Modern Languages," in "Academic History of the Military Academy, 1801— 
1902," ed. E. S. H. Tillman, in The Centennial of the United States 
Military Academy at West Point, New York. 1802-1902, 2 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 1:311.
11John Bigelow, Jr., to Jane Poultney Bigelow, 12 September 
1874, Bigelow Family Papers, box 96, Rare Books and Manuscripts 
Division, New York Public Library (NYPL). Interestingly,
Headquarters, U.S. Military Academy, Official Register of the Officers 
and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy. West Point, N.Y., June, 1877. 
June 30, 1877, p. 29 indicates that Bigelow excelled in French,
scoring 95.8 out of a possible 100 merit points for graduation; in 
Spanish he earned 62.6 out of a possible 75 merit points.
12john Bigelow, Jr., On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo, with a 
Foreward, Introduction, and Notes by Arthur Woodward (Los Angeles: 
Westernlore Press, 1968), p. 3.
13John Bigelow, Jr., Modern Language Notes: French (Boston: 
A. D. Maclachlan, 1906), p. 2.
1l1See, for example, U.S., Department of War, Official Army 
Register for January. 1883 (Washington, D.C.: Adjutant General's
Office, January 1, 1883), p. 328.
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Courses in English had not been offered at the academy for ten years, 
from 1867-77.1® His prime concern, however, was the historical study 
of strategy and tactics.
Bigelow believed there were basic and fundamental 
deficiencies in the professional development of army officers. As an 
instructor in tactics at West Point he was confined by the restrictive 
curriculum and was as disappointed in the program of instruction as he 
had been as a student. Nevertheless, Bigelow tried to impart a 
historical appreciation of the art of war to offset the academy’s 
rigid mechanical emphasis on fortifications, weapons, and tactics. 
Fortunately, Emory Upton’s text on Infantry Tactics, Double and Single 
Rank. Adapted to American Topography and Improved Firearms was a 
required text.16 it was "hailed as the greatest single advance in 
tactical instruction since the work of General Steuben during the 
Revolution.1,17 Bigelow had become familiar with the text as a cadet, 
and it helped him conceptualize the impact of modern weapons on 
tactics. Upton's principles of infantry tactics, drawn from his 
experiences during the Civil War, had been in use in the army since 
1871. Previously the army drew upon the French example.1® Upton's
"•^Fleming, West Point, p. 236.
1®Edward S. Holden and W. L. Ostrander, ”A Tentative List of 
Textbooks Used in the United States Military Academy at West Point 
from 1802 to 1902," in The Centennial of the United States Military 
Academy. 1:458.
17t . Harry Williams, Americans at War: The Development of the 
American Military System (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1960), p. 91.
1®Ibid.; see also Ganoe, The History of the United States 
Army, p. 317.
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manual was the first original exposition of an American system of 
tactics. The system allowed greater ease and flexibility in movement 
and opened ranks to counter the effects of advanced weaponry, 
particularly artillery. Bigelow was impressed by this practical 
application of the American experience in war but persisted in the 
study of the Franco-Prussian War.
Historical Study of European Warfare
Why did Bigelow pursue his study of the Franco-Prussian War? 
Bigelow's examination of that conflict enabled him to expand and 
refine his own assessments of the impact of modern weapons on tactics 
and of the problems inherent in the movement and supply of large 
armies. Bigelow's interest in a military profession was triggered by 
the carnage he witnessed during the Franco-Prussian War. It follows
that he would devote the beginning of his career to acquiring a fuller 
and better understanding of the conflict. He was motivated by a 
conviction that the United States Army should not be unprepared to 
wage effective combat, as were the French in 1870.19 He admired
Germany's superior military performance and was impressed by Helmut 
von Moltke's detailed planning for combat. Certainly in the aftermath 
of the Franco-Prussian War the study of German military thought was 
logical.
The publication of Bigelow's careful analysis of the battles
19see, for example, John Bigelow to William Allen Butler, 14 
November 1870, in John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life. 5
vols. (New York: Baker 4 Taylor Co., vols. 1-3, 1909), and (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page 4 Co., vols. 4-5, ed. John Bigelow, Jr., 
1913), 4:429-34; see also Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen, pp. 321-22.
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of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte was a significant milestone in his 
career. Bigelow had carefully assembled the treatise from the German 
official report of the war, a sketch by General Julius von Verdy du 
Vernois, and additional primary materials his father had provided 
which were not generally available.20 The elder Bigelow gave his son 
personal and official correspondence that provided young Bigelow a 
broader perspective on the conflict. He included detailed orders of 
battle, battlefield terrain analysis, and thorough descriptions of the 
dispositions of opposing forces. Historians recognize it as an 
important contribution to military history.2' Contemporary reviewers 
were very complimentary. The Army and Navy Journal reported on June 
21, 1884 that "in preparing these elaborate studies of recent modern 
engagements Bigelow has not only increased his military knowledge and 
contributed to the instruction of the service, but has set an example 
which we should be glad to see generally followed by our young 
officers.1,22 Nevertheless, while it was an important contribution to 
the professional education of army officers, it failed to advance or 
redirect American military strategy. Bigelow’s study of Mars-la-Tour 
and Gravelotte was pedestrian in its focus on the European experience 
in warfare.
20John Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 22 September 1877 and 11 
March 1878, box 12, NYPL.
2^See, for example, American Historical Review 41 (April 
1936):607, s.v. "Obituary: Bigelow."; see also Robin Higham, ed., A 
Guide to the Sources of United States Military History (Hamden, Conn.: 
Archon Books, 1975), p. 46; and Weigley, History of the United States 
Army, p. 274.
22Army and Navy Journal. 21 June 1884, p. 963; see also The 
Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 17 June 1884 and 21 June 1884, USMA.
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Progressive officers routinely studied European military 
history, culling lessons to apply to their own army.23 The army, for 
example, had commissioned official studies of European military 
systems during the Crimean War, 1853-56, and General George B. 
McClellan had published a popular examination of The Armies of Europe 
in 1861.24 Major General George W. Cullum, superintendent of the 
United States Military Academy at the close of the Civil War, ignored 
the American experience and continued to urge the study of the 
European model. The United States Army regularly dispatched military 
attachSs to Europe to observe training and to report on military 
institutions.25 General Philip H. Sheridan served as a military 
observor with the German army during the Franco-Prussian War, and he 
had witnessed the battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte.26 in 1874 
General Sherman dispatched Emory Upton to observe the British and 
Russian armies in India and central Asia.27 Thus, Bigelow’s 
examination of the battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte was 
consistent with the military inclination to study European armies.
The completeness of the Prussian victory had astonished the 
world. For years the French Army had been the model for military
23Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, p.
13.
24Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military 
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962), p. 56.
25see, for example, 0. L. Hein, Memories of Long Ago by an 
Old Army Officer (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), p. 164.
26Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. p. 41.
27weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 104.
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historians and serious soldiers.28 Bigelow sought to discern the 
reasons for the French failure and the German success. He found 
particularly appealing the distinguishing German character in 
w a r f a r e . 29 Also, Bigelow discerned how the concerted professional 
development of the Prussian officer corps had effectively prepared it 
for the detailed planning prior to and during the invasion.
The Franco-Prussian War
Bigelow was an ardent student of Jomini and understood how 
the principles he espoused could be applied to the conduct of war. 
But Bigelow's study of the Franco-Prussian War alerted him to the 
influences of technology and industrialization on warfare. He 
realized from reading Jomini that principles of war might be 
unchanging but that their application had to be based on a careful 
assessment of technological c h a n g e . 30 The telegraph and railroad were 
innovations that were not anticipated by Jomini, yet Bigelow learned 
that they did not drastically affect the basic principles of war. For 
example, concentration of forces was a Napoleonic concept that all 
soldiers understood. The study of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte 
indicated to Bigelow that this concentration could no longer be
28Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War; The German 
Invasion of France. 1870-1871 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), p. 
1.
29Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. p. 23.
30 j. p. Wisser, review of The Principles of Strategy: 
Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns, by John Bigelow, Jr., in 
Journal of the United States Artillery 3 (July 1894):517; see also 
Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War." in Carl von 
Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 57.
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attained simply by skillful maneuver on the field of battle. The 
German General Staff demonstrated that concentration had to develop 
from extended plans for mobilization, movement, and supply long before 
a conflict began.31 Since the first battle of a war could be 
decisive, effective conscription, training, and logistical 
organization were critical to victory.
Bigelow studied the Franco-Prussian War closely. He noted 
how technological innovations had altered the manner in which warfare 
was conducted. It was apparent, moreover, that the role of the junior 
officers and non-commissioned officers had greatly appreciated. The 
increased range and lethality of weapons demanded open and fluid 
formations capable of rapid maneuver on the battlefield, frequently 
under cover. This required increased dependence on subordinate 
commanders at the lowest tactical levels. Previously the commanding 
generals maneuvered large rigid formations in accord with a 
preconceived scheme of operations. Bigelow learned that this was no 
longer possible and realized that America’s junior officers needed to 
understand the principles of strategy if U.S. Army generals had to 
rely on them in a war.
Bigelow understood that warfare was becoming increasingly 
more complex. Although the individual skill of the commander was 
still crucial to victory, he discerned that the wisdom and 
knowledgeable staff work by a multitude of other specialized officers 
was also essential. The exigencies of war, particularly the wide 
dispersion of forces necessitated by the lethality of new weaponry,
3lHoward, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 4.
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made the will of the commander more difficult to exert on the 
battlefield. Junior officers had to assume greater responsibility for 
leadership. The commander's lack of direct control over the course of 
a battle also demanded that more detailed preparations precede a 
battle and necessarily involve a wide array of subordinate commanders 
and specialized staff officers. These staff officers and subordinate 
commanders had to be familiar with the commander's plan of battle so 
they could anticipate the will of the commander even when the ebb and 
flow of the battle inhibited communication of orders. Bigelow 
foresaw, then, a need to develop the U.S. Army's young officers to 
fill this vital role in war. He did not believe that the contemporary 
military literature and methods of instruction served that end, and he 
resolved to prepare a study that would meet American needs.
Bigelow's study of the Franco-Prussian War also showed him 
how the technological advances in weapons had served to transform 
tactics. Bigelow saw that victory at Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte had 
not been achieved by bold frontal offensive action. Infantry and 
cavalry charges led to heavy casualties. Victory was gained by 
maneuver, innovative artillery bombardments, and flanking actions. 
The superiority of the French chassepot rifle, for example, led the 
Germans to hold their infantry out of range while their artillery 
hammered the French positions. Bigelow also noted the shortcomings of 
cavalry reconnaissance in the face of rifled breech-loading weapons. 
Dua to ineffective reconnaissance the Germans had attacked a French 
force at Mars-la-Tour of twice the strength.32 Only effective,
32Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. p. 6.
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dynamic command prevailed. Bigelow may have wondered why the German 
offensive succeeded over the French defense, bolstered with machine 
guns, when just the opposite took place during the American Civil War. 
He realized Europeans generally ignored the lessons of the Civil War. 
His study exposed the deficiencies of French tactics. The French 
dedication to the offensive, a false martial spirit, and the elan of 
the sabre and bayonet, blinded the French commanders to the advantages 
of the defense.33 The French staff system had neglected the
historical study and analysis of war.
What did Bigelow learn from his study of the Franco-Prussian
War? His carefully constructed monographs displayed no startling
military maneuvers or innovative tactics. Further, neither the French
nor the Germans had exploited the technological advantages of their
weaponry— the French chassepot rifle very nearly counterbalanced the
Prussian breech-loading guns.31* Bigelow was redirected to consider
strategy. He showed that German preparation for war and detailed
organization had enabled Moltke to concentrate superior numbers,
particularly during the battle of Gravelotte. Bigelow curtly
summarized Moltke*s intentions:
The German plan of operations was singular for its simplicity and 
disrespect of conventionality. Had it been strictly carried out 
thousands of German mothers would have been spared the affliction 
that crushed out of them forever every joyful thought or emotion 
connected with the victory of Gravelotte. Von Moltke*s plan was 
to make his numerical superiority tell with such force and 
rapidity that the French would have neither strength nor time to 
dispute it.35
33ibid., p. 16.
3%oward, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 455.
35]3igelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, p. 66.
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German victory was secured, Bigelow believed, not only by Moltke's
superior organization and the rigorous unit training that occurred 
before war was decided upon but also by the preparatory staff work and 
professional development of the Prussian officer corps. The 
theoretical study of war was crucial to victory.36
From his study of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. Bigelow
concluded that American officers were being poorly prepared for the 
next war.37 The Indian wars did not prepare the American army for a 
major conventional war against large armies. The frontier soldier in 
his campaigns against the Indians operated in small, mobile 
detachments and carried their supplies with them or on pack mules. 
Even the few major concentrations of army forces for the Indian wars 
were conducted by units required to sustain themselves. Bigelow's 
study of the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated that any major
deployment or commitment of D.S. Army forces would require detailed 
planning for mobilization, transportation, and supply. The Franco- 
Prussian War indicated that each individual facet of a campaign 
required specialists to plan the operation in minute detail. Medical 
support, for example, would require that selected supplies be 
prepositioned; that medical personnel and other necessary provisions 
be transported with a deploying unit; and that arrangements be made
36najo Holborn, "Moltke's Strategical Concepts," Military
Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute 6 (Fall 1942):153. 
See also Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. p. 23.
37see, for example, Bigelow's discussion in Colonel Albert G. 
Brackett, "Our Cavalry: Its Duties, Hardships, and Necessities, at Our 
Frontier Posts," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the 
United States 4 (September 1883):406.
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for the care of sick and wounded at the front and for the evacuation 
of casualties. As similar requirements mount for rations, ordnance, 
forage and other essential equipment and supplies, Bigelow understood 
that the planning task became insurmountable for a commander without a 
specially trained staff. Further, Bigelow came to believe that the 
American predilection for Jomini, woven into the fabric of the army by 
Henry W. Halleck and Dennis Hart Mahan, was stifling the initiative of 
its young officers. The rote principles espoused by Jomini failed to 
prepare officers for the spontaneity required by modern warfare. On 
the other hand, Moltke's strategy was rooted in an appreciation of 
Clausewitz and a historical understanding of the dynamic role of the 
battlefield c o m m a n d e r . 38 Bigelow understood that future captains 
would need not simply to master principles of war but to comprehend 
the vicissitudes of logistics, topography, communication, and 
political strategy. Future captains would also have to depend on a 
skilled staff.
Limited War
Bigelow's study of the French debacle convinced him that 
moderation in war required strict central control and was difficult to 
a c h i e v e . 39 He discerned the concept of limited war as applied by Otto 
von Bismarck in his carefully measured campaign against France. Each 
of the wars of German unification were guided by a studied moderation 
of military power in pursuit of limited political goals and
38Holborn, "Moltke's Strategical Concepts," p. 155.
39Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. pp. 65-66.
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objectives. Bismarck's restrained use of the preponderant Prussian 
Army during the period 1864 to 1871 was in basic contrast to the 
limited conflicts prior to the French Revolutionary War. Those 
earlier wars were inherently constrained by limited military means and 
capabilities. Bismarck, on the other hand, knew that he had to 
harness a mobilized army of vast abilities and he deliberately 
subordinated Moltke, the German General Staff, and an expanding 
militarism to the tempered designs of diplomacy.1*0 It was a difficult 
political policy to force on the German General Staff, but Bigelow 
appreciated its necessity. Interestingly, when General Schofield 
helped to reinforce this important perspective, Bigelow realized that 
it went counter to much of the current military thinking in America. 
Schofield believed that limited wars were a valid and necessary 
political strategy.1*1 Bigelow echoed Schofield's belief by asserting 
that military strategy must be defined by the purposes the federal 
government had established for war. During a meeting of the Military 
Service Institution on November 8, 1883 Bigelow chided General Sherman 
and argued that "the great want of our . . . army, is a purpose."1*2
**°See, for example, Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The
Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1957), p. 65; see also Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 311. It was 
not a simple political strategem to implement. Gordon A. Craig, The 
Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1956), pp. 204-16, describes just how precarious it really was.
**1Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 169; see also 
Weigley's earlier treatment of this issue in "The Military Thought of 
John M. Schofield," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military 
Institute 23 (Summer 1959):78-80.
**2Quoted in Brackett, "Our Cavalry: Its Duties, Hardships, 
and Necessities, at Our Frontier Posts," p. 406.
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Bigelow feared that the growing economic and technological 
foundations of modern states increased the army’s capacity and
propensity for unlimited war. Bismarck understood the stark limits 
within which military power could be usefully asserted. He selected, 
planned, and controlled the use of military force for limited ends and 
made a sharp distinction between a Prussian capacity for war and the 
inclination to employ it. While Bigelow greatly admired the
organizational effectiveness and the military preparedness of the
Prussian army, he also appreciated Bismarck’s control and mitigation 
of military aims by the demands of state policy. Moltke had fashioned 
a progressive military institution and planned in detail for its 
employment. Moltke, however, did not appreciate Clausewitz’s concern 
that military means must be subjugated to political ends, whereas 
Bismarck was consistent in its a p p l i c a t i o n . ^3 Bigelow acknowledged 
that
the cause of a war is a political matter, the course of it is a 
military matter. But neither is independent of the other. The 
cause determines the object and this is a factor in the
operations. The object suggests the plans of the commander and 
has much to do with the inspiration, with the morale, of his 
troops.^
Bigelow, therefore, clearly grasped the political limits of 
military power as preached by Clausewitz and practiced by Bismarck. 
His belief was rooted in the Clausewitzian observation that military
^3craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945. p. 
181; see also Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in 
Clausewitz, On War, p. 30.
^John Bigelow, Jr., "The Russo-German War: A Military
Sketch," August 1914, in The Colonel John Bigelow Papers, box 76, 
series 2, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LC), Washington,
D.C., p. 2.
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power must be subordinate to political power. Bigelow knew that a 
simple military strategy of annihilation was self-destructive. His 
study of the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated that Bismarck had 
understood that the object of limited war was "to inflict losses or to 
pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under 
dispute."45 This was a strategic goal that Bigelow found appealing. 
He wondered how best to apply this premise and resolved to intensify 
his research and study. The lessons he drew from his study of the 
Franco-Prussian War were bolstered by his examination of other 
European conflicts and from the American military experience.
The American Experience in War
The publication of General Sherman’s Memoirs in 1875 made 
available much candid testimony on the conduct of the Civil War. 
Bigelow was a tremendous admirer of Sherman, and the autobiographical 
study probably redirected Bigelow’s attention to the professional 
study of his own army. Bigelow may have been dismayed by the 
disregard the Prussian commanders displayed toward the lessons of the 
American experience. He understood that both the Franco-Prussian War 
and the American Civil War demonstrated that the chasm between the 
warring armies and the civilian populations was gone.46 The rapid 
development of transportation and communication led Bigelow to 
conclude that civil populations were as much a part of the conflict as 
the soldiers at the front. He saw this as approaching Clausewitz*s
^Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 123.
^Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 96.
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concept of "absolute war."1*? He applied this principle to his 
historial study of conflict.
Bigelow remained at the academy until August 1884 and devoted 
himself to the study of American campaigns.1*® He proved to be a 
prolific writer and essayist. An article on "The Sabre and Bayonet 
Question," read before the Military Service Institute on September 15, 
1881 and later published in its journal, was particularly popular and 
controversial and it was heatedly discussed for many years.**9 These 
interesting and important efforts, however, were by-products of his 
fertile, active, and imaginative intellect. A comprehensive study of 
American strategy had become a driving passion.®® He studied 
Sherman's Memoirs in detail and Badeau's Military History of U.S. 
Grant published in 1882. He pursued an exhaustive examination of the 
American Revolution as well as the Civil War.5* Bigelow likely took a 
particular interest in Henry P. Johnston's campaign study of The 
Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis. 1781. published in 
1881 which paralleled his own analysis of military events displayed in
^Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 3.
**®D.S., Department of War, Special Orders No. 74, Adjutant 
General's Office, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1884.
**9john Bigelow, Jr., "The Sabre and Bayonet Question," 
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 3 
(January-March 1882):65—96.
®°He had married Mary Braxton Dallam on April 28, 1883.
Nevertheless, he spent much of his time reading and writing on 
strategy and tactics. His wife must have been very patient and 
supportive.
®1See, for example, John Bigelow, Jr., The Principles of 
Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns, 2nd ed.
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1894), p. 11.
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his study of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte* Campaign studies were of 
particular interest to Bigelow for their analysis of strategy.
Bigelow did not abandon a broader view of military history, 
strategy, and policy. He continued to explore European studies of the 
art of war and made extensive notes on German General Colmar von der 
Goltz's The Nation in Arms.52 He studied the current texts on 
strategy that recounted the experiences of Napoleon and Frederick the 
Great.53 Many of the strategists and tacticians that he read had 
tried to bridge the gap between the old and new styles of warfare by 
identifying the similarities and enumerating principles that could be 
projected into the conduct of future war.54 Jomini, in particular, 
who still had a great influence on Bigelow, defined the form of future 
war in geometric terms of recurring principles of maneuver and lines 
of communication. Bigelow, however, also tried to assimilate the 
concepts of Clausewitz into his thinking. Clausewitz emphasized the 
differences between the old and new systems of war. He particularly 
emphasized the political aspects of war. His concept of "absolute 
war" took into account the importance of the populations of the 
belligerents. To Bigelow, therefore, the population became a 
legitimate target in war and to this end he applied Bismarck’s object 
of limited war. His evolving conception of the totality of war was 
reinforced by his study of the history of American military campaigns
52ihe Colonel John Bigelow Papers, box 44, series 1, LC.
53see, for example, Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, pp.
11-13.
54Michael Howard, War in European History (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 96.
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during the Revolutionary War, Mexican War, and Civil War, and 
particularly the Civil War campaigns of his idol General William 
Tecumseh Sherman.55 it was a warfare both brutal and total that
Bigelow explored.
The development of the railroad further reinforced Bigelow’s 
concept of total war. He saw, during the Civil War and the Franco- 
Prussian War, that the railway systems linked the populations to the 
military front as supplies moved rapidly from the cities and
industrial regions to the soldiers in combat.56 The telegraph further 
linked the civil populations to the front as correspondents dispatched 
details of the battles to newspapers in near real-time. No longer 
could the people of belligerent nations be isolated from the effects 
of modern war; the Industrial Revolution had made them inseparable. 
The logistic needs of an army were fulfilled by the nation's 
manufacturing and commercial interests. Even the will of the 
commander drew sustenance from the civilian reaction to reports of his 
exploits on the battlefield.
Bigelow was intent on publishing his own book on strategy. 
His father, a prolific writer and diarist, had repeatedly urged him to 
prepare a manuscript. Onfortunately, although the respite at the 
academy afforded Bigelow time for scholarship and research, he was 
soon returned to duty on the frontier. His reassignment, however, did 
not diminish his desire to publicize his views.
55weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 96.
56Howard, War in European History, p. 98; see also Howard, 
The Franco-Prussian War, p. 2.
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Why was he so intent on publication? The fate that befell 
France in the course of the short Franco-Prussian War instilled in 
Bigelow a driving need to learn more about the conduct of warfare. It 
was not an atypical reaction. Military professionals throughout the 
world's armies were reawakened by the swift German success, and the 
Prussian example was examined and copied. Moreover, Bigelow believed 
that the professional study of military history was the only way to 
learn about the conduct of war short of actually commanding in combat. 
That was one reason he explored the German and French actions at Mars- 
la-Tour and Gravelotte in detail. The future, he believed, called for 
a large body of efficient officers, well-schooled in the conduct of 
war. He recognized that the army's role on the frontier, policing a 
vast region, made no demands on officers to acquire this essential 
knowledge.57 The army lacked purpose. Bigelow felt he could
contribute to the overall professionalism of the army if he publicized 
his views. He deduced from his study of the Franco-Prussian War that 
careful preparation for war was crucial and provided a necessary 
purpose or focus for the professional education of officers.
Bigelow further realized that technology was making war more 
and more complex. Staff officers would need to plan for the rapid 
deployment and support of large mobile armies. He envisioned the 
requirements for the swift transport of supplies and personnel by rail 
or over redundant and improved roadways. The telegraph, which
heralded improved communication, would speed the flow of implementing
57Brackett, "Our Cavalry: Its Duties, Hardships, and
Necessities, at Our Frontier Posts," p. 406.
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orders and vital battlefield information.58 Bigelow was aware that 
the United States Army was unprepared to adapt quickly to these 
changing conditions of warfare. He turned to history, therefore, to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of war as a total phenomenon.
58Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. p. 65.
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CHAPTER IV
"AFTER GERONIMO": JOHN BIGELOW, JR.,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRESSIVE MILITARY ETHIC
The Indian Wars
Where would Bigelow turn to gain a greater appreciation of
war? He had been promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant on
September 24, 1883 -1 General Sherman had retired on November 1, 1883, 
and was succeeded as commanding general by General Philip H.
Sheridan. All the same, Bigelow continued to be influenced by the 
indelible mark Sherman had impressed upon the army. Goaded by
Sherman’s Memoirs, Bigelow re-evaluated his experience on the frontier 
in west Texas and questioned American military doctrine. Despite the 
popularity of his study of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. Bigelow 
surmised that the limited wars of Europe had no useful corollary in 
America's extended Indian wars.2 He observed a more cogent analogy in 
Sherman's Civil War campaign against the citizens of Atlanta. 
Weigley, in an essay on "American Strategy from Its Beginnings Through 
the First World War" in Peter Paret’s edition of Makers of Modern
^U.S., Department of War, Official Army Register for January, 
1885 (Washington, D.C.: Adjutant General's Office, January 1, 1885), 
p. 87.
^The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 17 June 1884 and 21 June 
1884, John Bigelow, Jr., Papers, United States Military Academy (USMA) 
Library.
49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
Strategy, states that "Bigelow almost alone, except for an occasional 
Civil War memorist, tried to assess the implications of the Civil War 
for offensive strategy."3
The conduct of America’s wars against the Indians buttressed 
Bigelow’s understanding of the need for total warfare. He noted that 
encumbered cavalry forces were unable to hunt down the light, mobile 
Indian bands. Frustrated field commanders, charged with subduing the 
hostiles, impressed frontiersmen and friendly Indians to ferret out 
the enemy’s hidden villages.1* Violent surprise attacks of converging 
columns of cavalry troops trapped the marauding Indians in their 
villages and forced them to stand and fight to protect their women, 
children, stocks, and supplies. Denied the mobility that allowed them 
to prevail over the army, the Indians succumbed to this superior 
concentration of forces. When applying this effective strategy, the 
army invariably slaughtered Indian women and children.5
Many military men tried to limit the indiscriminate killing 
of noncombatants by devising alternate strategies. General George 
Crook, the leading Indian-fighter in the frontier army, warned his 
subordinates to "avoid the killing of women and children."6 He
3Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings 
Through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 439.
^Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army 
and the Indian. 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 
p. 54.
5lbid., p. 52.
^John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1891; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska
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developed innovative methods to enhance the mobility of his forces in 
order to thwart his foe in the field. For the traditional slow, 
cumbersome army wagon train he substituted pack mules to move 
provisions in a more rapid fashion and over rugged terrain. He 
divided his force into small operating detachments capable of quick 
reaction and speedy pursuit of renegade Indians.7 He employed Indian 
scouts to ruthlessly ferret out and track their brethren.
Crook dispersed his command to interdict the overland 
movement of the Indians and hounded his prey during year-round 
campaigns, even throughout winter. Crook spared the women and 
children from the direct physical assault of the army but inflicted 
wanton privation, denying food and shelter in an effort to force the 
Indians onto reservations. Bigelow examined these strategies and 
realized that the future form of effective warfare must include the 
civilian population as a legitimate target.
The Tenth Cavalry in Arizona
The Indian wars were drawing to a dramatic conclusion, and 
Bigelow and the Tenth Cavalry were to play major supporting roles. 
Bigelow rejoined the regiment at Fort Davis, Texas, on Novemebr 16, 
1884, just prior to the final Geronimo campaign in southern Arizona. 
The Tenth Cavalry was moved to Arizona on April 1, 1885, in an effort 
to help General Crook contain renegade Apaches.® The capable
Press, 1971), p. 182.
70die B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p. 32.
®John Bigelow, Jr., "The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry," in
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"buffalo soldiers" were still under the able command of Colonel 
Grierson and were scattered in outposts throughout the Arizona 
territory. Bigelow was posted to Fort Grant.9 General Crook had been 
embroiled in continuing conflict with officials from the Interior 
Department over the correct course of Indian policy. This unfortunate 
state of affairs climaxed when Chiricahua Apaches under Geronimo grew 
wary and bolted from their reservation in May 1885. ® Crook dispersed 
his cavalry regiments in a sweeping attempt to round up the runaway 
Indians. Grierson’s Tenth Cavalry was located at various points along 
the Mexican border, and detachments were stretched out in the 
wearisome duty of watching waterholes, mountain passes, and crossing 
p o i n t s . B i g e l o w ’s troop was busy scouting along the border and 
trying to cover the area between the dispersed outposts.
Commanding General of the Army, Philip H. Sheridan, tired of 
Crook’s failure to contain Geronimo. He put Nelson A. Miles in charge 
of the expedition on April 2, 1886, and demanded rapid results.12 
Miles set up an elaborate system of heliograph stations to speed the 
transmission of reconnaissance reports on the location of the Apaches,
Blacks in the Dnited States Armed Forces; Basic Documents, vol. 3! 
Freedom and Jim Crow. 1865-1917. ed. Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard
C. Nalty (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1977), p. 49.
9john Bigelow, Jr., On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. with a 
Forward, Introduction, and Notes by Arthur Woodward (Los Angeles: 
Westernlore Press, 1968), p. 3.
10william H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the 
Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1967), p. 463.
UBigelow, "The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry," p. 52.
I^Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 243.
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and he kept detachments in constant pursuit of Geronimo.**3 Geronimo 
finally wearied and surrendered in August 1886.
Bigelow, emulating the example of his father, kept a detailed 
journal of his experiences during the Geronimo campaign.11* Bigelow 
was anxious to have his journal published; therefore it was not a 
spontaneous diary but was prepared intentionally for print.15 As a
result, it is much more than a straight-forward chronicle of Bigelow’s 
day to day activities. The diary presents a critical commentary of 
frontier duty, details the hardships endured by the black "buffalo 
soldiers," and assays the professionalism of the army. It was 
published by his brother, Poultney Bigelow, in fourteen installments 
in Outing Magazine during March 1886, to April 1887. The series, 
entitled "After Geronimo," was collated and republished in 1968 by 
Westernlore Press. It was retitled On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. 
Arthur Woodward, in the Forward to the book, compared Bigelow's diary 
favorably with Captain John G. Bourke's classic account of army life, 
On the Border with Crook.1& Bigelow's published journal did much to
13Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic: Memories of the 
Civil and Military Life of Nelson A. Miles (New York: Harper & Bros. 
Publishers, 1911), p. 223.
1l*See John Bigelow to John Bigelow, Jr., 5 December 1877, The
Papers of John Bigelow, box 12, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division,
New York Public Library.
15woodward, Forward to On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. p.
vii.
1̂ Ibid., p. viii. John Bret Harte, in a review of On the
Bloody Trail of Geronimo. by John Bigelow, Jr., in The Journal of
Arizona History 10 (Summer 1969):135, indicates Bigelow's journal has 
been "burdened" with the sensational title Westernlore Press gave it. 
He much prefers Bigelow's own title, "After Geronimo."
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publicize the exploits and hardships of the frontier army. Moreover, 
it remains a lasting social commentary of the daily routine and rigors 
of army life in 1885. Interestingly, Bigelow's journal was 
illustrated by Frederic Remington, at that time still a struggling 
young artist.1?
Bigelow had decided that he must continue to publish 
commentary and articles in order to establish himself as a military 
writer.18 This was essential, he realized, if he wished to publish a 
book on strategy. He knew the prospects for a military writer were 
bleak. Publishers offered no encouragement to suggest he could make 
any money at it. To his dismay he learned that recent military works 
were not even being purchased by the government for post libraries.19 
Regardless, he busily continued to write on American strategy and 
tactics, anxiously and hopefully looking forward to having a book 
published.20 a measure of Bigelow's professionalism can be found in 
his diary entry that "whether I publish any of it or not, I have no 
fear of my time being wasted."21 Bigelow's popular journal, 
therefore, did not supplant his interest in developing a more 
scholarly critique of the army. Even during the campaign in Arizona, 
Bigelow took a great professional interest in General Crook.
1?Woodward, Forward to On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. p. 
ix; see also Poultney Bigelow, Seventy Summers, 2 vols. (New York: 
Longman's, Green & Co., 1925), 1:304.
1®The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 1 October 1884, USMA.
19ibid., 7 October 1884.
2°Ibid., 10 July 1884.
21Ibid.
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The Geronimo Campaign
Bigelow carefully examined official papers at Fort Grant and
Fort Huachuca that helped him assess the performance of Crook and his
successor, Nelson A. Miles.22 Bigelow was intrigued by Crook’s
disregard of standing army procedure during the Apache wars. He was
impressed by Crook’s efforts to enhance the army’s mobility and speed
in pursuit of hostile Indians, particularly his innovative employment
of pack mules and skilled packers. Although the load for a pack mule
might be limited to 150-180 pounds depending on the skill of the
packer, Crook’s trains under exceptionally able packers carried over
300 pounds each.23 Of greater significance, Crook's use of Indian
scouts was particularly controversial and was never accepted by
General Sheridan. Their employment ultimately contributed to Crook's
dismissal.2^ Bigelow was not sure if Crook’s use of Indian scouts was
an original concept or patterned after the British use of native
auxiliaries. Nevertheless, there was certainly no European precedent
for the manner in which Crook employed them. Bigelow noted in his
diary that the British
drill and discipline their native auxiliaries, and officer them 
with a view to leading and directing them in action. General
22Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. p. 117.
23Lieutenant H. L. H. Waite, "Packs and Packing," Journal of 
the United States Cavalry Association 13 (October 1902):177.
24Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo. ed. M. M. Quaife, 
with a Foreward by Robert M. Utley (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1929; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1976), p. 218.
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Crook simply turns his natives loose in stronger numbers than the 
enemy, and with an unfailing supply of provisions and ammunition, 
relying upon those two advantages for their success.25
Thomas W. Dunlay, in Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and
Auxiliaries with the United States Army. 1860-90. notes that Crook
took away the advantages formally bestowed on his adversary and
transposed them to his own forces.2® Bigelow simply observed that
"General Crook makes of his Indian auxiliaries, not soldiers, but more
formidable Indians."27 it was clearly a stratagem that Bigelow
endorsed.
Bigelow's detachment, which participated in the pursuit of
Geronimo, was one of the regular army elements that guarded the
mountain passes between Mexico and Arizona. It was Crook's strategem
to put the Indian scouts on the trail of the Apache outlaws and
position his regular forces in strategic locations to block Geronimo's
safe passage and channel or restrict his free movement.2® Bigelow’s
role was an important one, although not the position of distinction he
coveted. He conceded in his journal that
I had rejoined my regiment with the expectation of gaining in 
efficiency from experience in the field, and I realized the fact 
that the opportunities for doing so in our army were becoming 
fewer and harder to seize every year. I also realized that 
laurels were scarce along Indian trails, and that they grew in 
difficult places. It was principally for the practice of looking 
and reaching for them, with the hope that the skillfulness thus
25Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. p. 44.
2®Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers; Indian 
Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army. 1860-90 (Lincoln: 
Dniversity of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 168.
27Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. pp. 45-46.
2®Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 468.
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acquired might some day serve me under more favorable conditions, 
that I aspired to getting on the trail of these Chiricahuas.29
Why did Bigelow seek combat duty? He might have hoped that 
valor in the field would have secured rapid promotion.30 The army 
promotion system was stagnant and First Lieutenant Bigelow knew that 
his normal progression to captain would occur slowly only through 
seniority.31 Perhaps he simply sought adventure. Bigelow's brother 
Poultney was a renowned adventurer, and John may have also desired 
similar excitement. Regardless, Bigelow principally sought to 
understand more of the nature of war, and this unassuming soldier did 
not seek to avoid Indian expeditions as did most of his colleagues.32
Why, then, did Bigelow not attempt to cull more lasting 
lessons from the U.S. Army's experience in the Indian wars? 
Apparently, he, like many others, viewed this experience as an 
aberration not likely to be repeated. Bigelow believed that waging a 
more conventional war, or preparing for it, was the only gainful 
purpose for the army. He was fearful that Indian-fighting experience 
might render the army unfit for future larger scale conflicts. He 
felt strongly that "other work than waging war may incidentally 
devolve upon an army without derogating from its dignity or 
efficiency, but when other work is its only work, and the only one for
29Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo, p. 2.
30see Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign, p. 31*
31See Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 20.
32jack C. Lane, Introduction to Chasing Geronimo: The Journal 
of Leonard Wood, May-September, 1886 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1970), p. 12.
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which it is fitted, the so-called army is but a police force."33 This 
restricting viewpoint was unfortunate, since his insightful commentary 
and analysis may have been the basis for a useful foundation for a 
doctrine or concept of unconventional warfare. Instead, Bigelow 
ignored the present Indian wars and projected his musing to future 
conventional wars. In that he was guided by the example of Sherman.
Thus, when General Miles relieved Crook in May 1886, Bigelow 
perceived no alteration in strategy.34 Miles, too, pursued a total 
war where Indian women, children, and other noncombatants were 
targets. In a bold, unrestrained, desultory tactic, Miles ruthlessly 
uprooted all the non-warring Chiricahua Apaches and relocated them in 
Florida.35 it was a stroke designed to isolate and demoralize the 
renegades Miles was chasing throughout southern Arizona and across the 
Mexican border with only limited success. To Bigelow, this 
counteroffensive in the rear of Geronimo* s band was warranted; it 
fitted his conceptualization of absolute or total war.36
Bigelow's concept of total war was not synonymous with 
unlimited war. In fact, his concept of total war was consistent with
33Quoted in Colonel Albert G. Brackett, "Out Cavalry: Its 
Duties, Hardships, and Necessities, at Our Frontier Posts," Journal of 
the Military Service Institution of the United States 4 (September 
1883):406.
3^Lane, Introduction to Chasing Geronimo, p. 9.
35woodward, Introduction to On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo,
p. xxv; and Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 398. See also Miles, Serving
the Republic, p. 227.
36john Bigelow, Jr., The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated
Mainly from American Campaigns. 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1894), p. 151.
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Bismarck's construct of limited war. Robert Endicott Osgood, in a 
modern study of limited war, defines unlimited war as one "fought with 
every means available in order to achieve ends that are without 
objective limits."37 On the other hand, he suggests that total war is 
subject to limitations imposed by deliberate, defined political 
objectives.38 Total war is a distinctly modern concept. Bigelow did 
not use the term "total war," nor could he have fully anticipated the 
lethality of modern weapons. Nevertheless, Weigley writes that "once 
he had endorsed a warfare against people as well as armies, the sheer 
frightfulness of twentieth-century total war was already implicit in 
what he wrote."39 yet Bigelow envisioned conscious limitations to the 
conduct of war. "When a war is determined on," he wrote, "the first 
step to be taken is to estimate the force that will be necessary for 
its prosecution."1̂
Bigelow's concept of total war is best understood in contrast 
to Clausewitz*s ideal of "absolute war." Clausewitz envisioned many 
gradations of war, of which "absolute war" was only the highest level. 
To wage war effectively, regardless of the level or intensity, 
combatants must constantly be aware of its highest form.111 Clausewitz
37Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to
American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 2.
38ibid., pp. 3-4.
39Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military 
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962), p. 97.
^Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, p. 259.
^1Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983), p. 51.
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realized that the absolute form of war never occurred but was 
restrained in part by the reasoned intentions of the belligerents.2*2 
So too did Bigelow envision deliberate limits to total war. He cited 
the War Department’s General Order Number 100 that defined the code of 
legitimate actions to govern the army as an obvious limitation.**3 He 
discarded any notion, however, that the only legitimate target of war 
was the enemy’s military forces.2*2* It is this calculated targeting of 
an enemy’s people that distinguishes Bigelow's idea of total war. It 
was a predisposition he found rooted in American military history.
The Myth of Isolation and the Growth 
of Army Professionalism
Bigelow spent much of his free time during the Geronimo 
campaign writing an examination of the American experience in war. It 
helped him cope with the intermittent rigors of patrolling and the 
apparent isolation and monotony of garrison duty in frontier Arizona. 
Huntington suggests that this reclusion on the frontier nurtured an 
expanding professionalism within the army. Only a few officers, 
however, filled the idle hours by reading and writing on military 
subjects. Most of the lasting contributions to military literature 
were prepared by the officers who staffed the army's postgraduate 
military school system, particularly Emory Upton, Arthur L. Wagner, 
and Eben Swift.
^Ibid.
**3john Bigelow, Jr., "On the Legitimate in War," in The 
Colonel John Bigelow Papers, box 104, series 3, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., p. 5.
^Ibid., p. 9.
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Few officers who saw extensive duty on the western frontier 
during the Indian wars produced important historical works. Most 
notable, perhaps, is John G. Bourke, Third Cavalry, whose studies On
the Border with Crook and An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre are
military classics. These studies are noted not only for the history 
they recount but also for their careful examination of Indian 
ethnology. Charles King wrote Campaigning with Crook in 1880, and it 
endures as a readable history of the American military frontier. The 
prolific King also penned over sixty novels that dealt with the Indian 
wars; they thrilled contemporary readers and did much to explain the 
plight and hardships of the frontier army to an indifferent civilian 
population.1̂  Bigelow, too, must be counted for his extraordinary 
works. He wrote with a detached passion for the army, the black
"buffalo soldiers," and the course of American military history.
A few other officers on the frontier prepared forgettable 
expositions on army campaigns and experiences in the west or quickly 
ignored critiques of army equipment or training. These remain 
available for historians to review in the initial issues of the 
professional military journals that prospered during the era of the 
Indian wars. For the most part, however, these journals were edited, 
managed, and filled with articles by the officers assigned to the 
military schools. Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, a contemporary of 
Bigelow assigned to the Sixth Cavalry in Arizona and a fellow
classmate at West Point, was compiling a history of artillery in the
^Army and Navy Journal. 23 December 1893, p. 297, reports 
that two of King’s popular novels of army life were among the 150 most 
popular novels in the nation based on a survey of important libraries.
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midst of the Geronimo campaign.**6 It was never published and remains 
sequestered in a collection of Gatewood’s private papers and 
correspondence in Tucson, Arizona. Gatewood gained fame, however, as 
one of General Crook's ablest commanders of Indian scouts. Official 
correspondence describes him as having "seen more active duty in the 
field with Indian scouts than any other officer of his length of 
service in the army."1*? Gatewood deserves full credit for the 
surrender of Geronimo in 1886. Bigelow, Gatewood, and a few others 
assigned to the frontier typified a growing concern for 
professionalism. Other officers serving in the west turned to liquor 
to lessen the stress of their assignments.^8 The vast majority of 
Indian army officers, however, simply performed their duty and 
remained indifferent to professional development.**9
More important, despite the appearance of physical isolation 
on the frontier, Bigelow, Gatewood, and other army officers interested 
in the intellectual development of the profession of arms, did not 
examine their roles in society in seclusion. Their thoughts, in many 
ways, reflected the same intellectual ferment found in concurrent 
civilian society.50 Bigelow, in particular, struggled with the same
^Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign, p. 68.
^Ibid., p. 38.
^Utley, Frontier Regulars. p. 90; see also Faulk, The 
Geronimo Campaign, p. 31.
1*9utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 23.
50john M. Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers 
in the Late 19th Century," Parameters; Journal of the U.S. Army War 
College 10 (September 1980):39.
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concepts that civilian humanitarians espoused for the treatment of 
blacks and Indians. Bigelow always tried to deal fairly with the 
blacks in the Tenth Regiment and he had a reputation for efficiency 
and just treatment.51 In his personal narrative of the Geronimo 
campaign, "After Geronimo," Bigelow examines both military and 
civilian attitudes towards his black cavalry troopers; he recounts the 
requirements for their remedial education; and he bemoans the 
condition of their equipment, barracks, and diet. Arthur Woodward, in 
a Forward to On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. observes that Bigelow's 
critique "reflects somewhat the undertone of a national awakening in 
this respect."52 Bigelow's summary of the sorrowful plight of his men 
in the structured military of his day may have helped to improve the 
status of blacks in the army.53 it was certainly unusual for a junior 
officer to criticize military procedure and army administration so 
candidly. Sociologist and historian Peter Karsten likens Bigelow and 
other army reformers to their contemporary civilian "progressives" in 
his study "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the
American Century."5^
5‘'Herschel V. Cashin et al, Under Fire with the Tenth U.S. 
Cavalry: Being a Brief. Comprehensive Review of the Negro's
Participation in the Wars of the United States, with an Introduction 
by Major General Joseph Wheeler (New York: F. Tennyson Neely, 1899; 
reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969), pp. 267-68 and 297.
52woodward, Introduction to On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo.
p. ix.
53syron C. Moore, review of On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. 
by John Bigelow, Jr., in Arizona and the West: A Quarterly Journal of 
History 1 (Spring 1959):95.
5^See Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America: From the 
Colonial Era to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 250; see
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Bigelow was indeed an "armed progressive," full of ideals and 
intent on exerting influence on the future direction of the army. In 
May 1884, at Fort Grant, Arizona, for example, he lamented in his 
diary the fact that Colonel (later Major General) William R. Shafter 
thought of the army principally as a national police force. Bigelow 
wrote critically that "I should want to leave the army if I had no 
higher conception of my career than that of a national police."55 
Many officers disgruntled with slow promotions did leave the army. 
Bigelow, and many others, however, were devoted to national service 
and worked to bring about reform.56 Bigelow’s father had carefully 
instilled in his sons, John and Poultney, this attachment to public 
service. The elder Bigelow selflessly served his country throughout 
his adult life, and believed that "public office was a trust not a 
perquisite."57 John Bigelow, Jr., acquired this outlook from his 
father, and it was nurtured over the years in frequent corespondence. 
Since his father was active in national and state politics, political 
reform movements, and the formulation of American foreign policy, 
young Bigelow was afforded a particularly informed perspective on 
current affairs.
Bigelow was never isolated from the mainstream of modern
American thought. Many of his contemporary officers came from equally
also Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late
19th Century," p. 39.
55The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 16 May 1885, USMA.
56Rarsten, The Military in America, p. 250.
57tfargaret Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), p. 275.
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well established families, similarly active in progressive society.58 
Karsten states in a study of "Father’s Occupation of West Point Cadets 
and Annapolis Midshipmen” that the officer corps was composed of men 
drawn "from more well-to-do families than the typical eligible 
male."59 Bigelow was not atypical.50 Gates indicates that quite 
possibly the officer corps, as a whole, was "not readily 
distinguishable from the nation’s civilian elites, except, of course, 
in their primary concern with military affairs."51 Bigelow’s career 
strongly suggests the correctness of Gates' conclusion and helps to 
debunk the myth of isolation.
Bigelow in Arizona
Despite the occasional travails of scouting in Arizona, 
Bigelow read voraciously, rarely leaving on patrol without a book.52 
The publication of the Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant in 1886 and 
George B. McClellan's recollections, McClellan’s Own Story, in 1887 
spurred Bigelow’s review of the U.S. Army and the history of warfare
58Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 43.
59Karsten, The Military in America, p. 87; see also Colonel 
Charles W. Larned, "The Genius of West Point," in The Centennial of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802-1902, 
2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 1: 482- 
83.
50see, for example, Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of 
the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1984), p. 157.
5lGates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century," p. 43.
52Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo, p. 3.
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in America. In 1886 the U.S. Cavalry Association was founded at Fort 
Leavenworth and began publication of a professional journal.63 This 
further invigorated Bigelow’s study. Bigelow read the available
professional journals and was particularly impressed with Arthur L.
Wagner’s prize essay for the United States Military Service 
Institution, "The Military Necessities of the United States and the 
Best Provisions for Meeting Them,” published in 1884.61* Wagner was an 
instructor at the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at 
Fort Leavenworth and was soon to be touted as the army’s foremost 
tactician. Bigelow appears to have been influenced by Wagner’s 
writings to a great extent. Although Wagner based his analysis of 
American military necessities on the European experience in war,
Bigelow tested his precepts against an American model. Wagner's essay 
certainly convinced Bigelow that he must publicise his own views.
Bigelow's journal, "After Geronimo," provides a valuable 
record of the day-by-day activities of the cavalry soldier in the 
American west. It stands in marked contrast to the heroic epochs by 
General Miles and even Geronimo on this exciting period. He discusses 
not only the routine operations of a cavalry regiment in the field, 
but also provides vivid geographic descriptions of the country
traversed in the course of the pursuit of Geronimo; he provides
insightful portraits of the people he met, and describes the
conditions to which his black troopers were subjected.
63o. L. Hein, Memories of Long Ago by an Old Army Officer
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 148.
^Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo, p. 146.
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Although Bigelow rarely mentions Geronimo himself or 
identifies him as one of the hostiles he pursued, Bigelow was at times 
close on his trail. John P. Clum, an Indian agent for the Chiricahua 
Apaches and later founder and editor of the Tombstone Epitaph, reports 
that Bigelow was very active in the pursuit. Bigelow picked up the 
trail of a portion of Geronimo*s band after a skirmish in the Catalina 
mountains.65 General Miles also cites Bigelow. In a letter to his 
wife, Mary, on June 7, 1886, Miles indicated concern over the extended 
length of the campaign against Geronimo and the growing
dissatisfaction being expressed in the newspapers. Although he had
been dismayed by the inability of his troops to deal effectively with 
the Indian bands, he was currently enthusiastic over an ongoing 
pursuit. He told his wife that "Lieutenant Bigelow has been close 
behind them for several days. In fact, they have been hunted by one 
detachment of troops after another for 36 days." He continues, 
explaining to his wife that "they have tried every device to throw the 
troops off the trail but have not succeeded. They have been followed 
rapidly for about one thousand miles."66 Bigelow eventually chased 
the Indians into Mexico.
More importantly, the journal highlights the plight of the
black "buffalo soldiers" in the frontier army. Bigelow bemoans the 
inadequacy of training, equipment, diet, and billets. Such
65John P. Clum, "Geronimo," Arizona Historical Review 1
(January 1929):15.
66Quoted in Virginia Weisel Johnson, The Unregimented 
General: A Biography of Nelson A. Miles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1962), pp. 237-38.
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progressive criticism appears enlightened for the period and marks
Bigelow as a reformer. Sociologist Morris Janowitz, in a study of The
Professional Soldier, states that such self-criticism is essential for
effective change:
But if it is to be more than self-castigation, self-criticism 
must have significant intellectual content. Intellectual ferment 
very often means stimulation from 'the outside,' even though the 
'outsider' may be found within the profession.®'
Bigelow was indeed stimulated from "outside" by the same humanitarian
traits and reform-mindedness that motivated his counterpart civilian
"progressives." He was, in fact, not isolated from civilian society
but rather reflected the traits that marked the main currents of
American thought.
®?Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and 
Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 430.
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CHAPTER V
THE PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY: JOHN BIGELOW, JR.,
AND THE DOCTRINE OF TOTAL WAR
The Adjutant General's Office
Bigelow's reassignment to the staff of the Adjutant General 
in Washington, D.C., in July 1887 greatly facilitated his study of 
American strategy.1 Duty in Washington afforded Bigelow ready access 
to official records. The Adjutant General, for example, not only 
issued the army's orders and commands, but was also the custodian of 
records and archives. In addition, the War Department had begun 
publishing The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies; 128 volumes were released 
between 1880 and 1901.2
Bigelow arrived in the midst of controversy. Brigadier 
General R. C. Drum was the Adjutant General upon Bigelow's assignment 
to the capital.3 The Adjutant General's Department was the most
1U.S., Department of War, Special Orders No. 153> Adjutant 
General's Office, Washington, D.C., July 5, 1887.
^Richard J. Sommers, "American Military History: The Middle 
Years, 1815-1916," in A Guide to the Study and Use of Military 
History, eds. John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 199.
3william Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States 
Army (D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942; reprint ed., Ashton, Md.: Eric 
Lundberg, 1964), p. 535.
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important of the ten autonomous War Department bureaus that operated 
under Secretary of War William C. Endicott.1* Together, the ten
bureaus comprised the departmental staff, called the War Department 
General Staff.5 At the time of Bigelow's assignment, the departmental 
staff of the Secretary of War was in heated conflict with the 
Commanding General of the Army, Philip H. Sheridan, who directed the 
army in the field. The commanding general did not command the army 
and was instead opposed by the different bureau chiefs who issued
orders direct to the field.® The commanding general had no staff to
forestall the erosion of his authority, and the War Department General
Staff generally hamstrung his control over the army.
The problem was of long standing. Sheridan's predecessor,
the great William Tecumseh Sherman, had tired of the bureaucratic
struggle and simply moved his headquarters to St. Louis. He wrote:
I realized that it was a farce, and it did not need a prophet to 
foretell it would end in tragedy. We made ourselves very
comfortable, made pleasant excursions into the interior, and had 
a large correspondence, and escaped the mortification of being 
slighted by men in Washington who were using their temporary
power for selfish ends.7
^See C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American 
Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, Pa.:
Stackpole Co., 1955), p. 298. The other bureaus were the Inspector 
General's Department, Quartermaster General's Department, Subsistence 
Department, Medical Department, Pay Department, Engineer Department, 
Ordnance Department, Signal Department, and Judge Advocate General's 
Department.
®James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army
Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 3.
®Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^Quoted in Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1932), p. 615.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
Many official studies of the problem had been commissioned since the 
end of the Civil War, but the tyranny of the bureau chiefs continued 
unabated. Bigelow was well versed in the imbroglio. Before his 
assignment to Washington he had read Peter Smith Michie's biography of 
Upton, Life and Letters of General Emory Upton, which detailed Upton’s 
criticism of the army’s system of command.® Although Upton's proposal 
for army reform, The Military Policy of the United States, was not 
published until 1904, manuscripts had circulated among like-minded 
officers and a copy had been placed in the archives of the Adjutant 
General's Department.9 Interestingly, Bigelow's father had recently 
been commissioned to help the Secretary of the Navy rectify similar 
organizational inefficiencies in the navy.
Arthur L. Wagner
Bigelow, as a junior officer, was confined to the routine 
planning and implementation of policy. Nevertheless, he began his 
tour in the Adjutant General's office with a thorough knowledge of his 
responsibilities and the controversies surrounding them. He 
understood he had an appreciably advantageous position from which to 
assay the army. Since General Drum was the principal military advisor
®The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 6 July 1885, John Bigelow, 
Jr., Papers, United States Military Academy (USMA) Library; see also 
T. Harry Williams, Americans at War; The Development of the American 
Military System (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 
P. 92.
9wallace E. Walker, "Emory Upton and the Army Officer's 
Creed," Military Review 61 (April 1981):67.
10Margaret Clapp, Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), p. 293.
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to the Secretary of War, despite General Sheridan's protestation to 
the contrary, Bigelow was witness to major army developments. His 
principal duty was the adjutant general of the District of Columbia 
militia with additional responsibilities for recruiting.11 He took a 
particular interest, however, in the Endicott Board, authorized by 
Congress in 1885 to examine the weapons and defenses of the United 
States.1^ The Board was an indication of renewed national interest in 
the army, and the interest in increased military appropriations 
encouraged Bigelow. The convening of the Endicott Board proved that 
reform-minded soldiers like Bigelow were not intellectually far 
removed from progressive civilian congressmen, business leaders, and 
newspaper editors.13
In 1889 First Lieutenant Arthur L. Wagner published a notable 
account of The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of the Austro-Prussian 
Conflict in the Light of the American Civil War. It was a unique 
study and affected Bigelow very much.111 As the title suggests, Wagner 
tried to highlight the American experience and evaluated Austrian and 
Prussian tactics in contrast to American methods. Wagner's thesis 
coincided with Bigelow's thinking and research. Wagner deplored the
11Major General George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of
the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, at West
Point. N.Y. from its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890: With the Early 
History of the United States Military Academy, 3rd ed., 3 vols. 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1891), 3:285; see also New York 
Times, 1 March 1936, sec. 2, p. 10.
^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, p. 247.
13see Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America: From the
Colonial Era to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 249.
1ltGanoe, The History of the United States Army, p. 363*
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fact that the experiences of the American armies in the Civil War were 
generally disregarded by Europeans. He indicated in the preface to 
his book that "European military writers generally, and those of the 
Continent especially, still fail to recognize in the developments of 
our war the germ, if not the prototype, of military features which are 
regarded as new in Europe."**5
Bigelow, too, questioned the overriding focus by military 
writers on the European experience.16 Not unlike Wagner, Bigelow 
lamented those within the U.S. Army who disregard the lessons to be 
drawn from the study of American military operations in deference to 
popular European examples.17 Wagner’s main interest, however, was in 
tactics."'® He compared the tactical features of the Austro-Prussian 
conflict of 1866 to similar aspects of the American Civil War."19 
Despite the utility of Wagner's comparison of European and American 
examples to instruct army officers on tactics, it was, nonetheless, 
another study of warfare on the European continent. Bigelow was 
intent on highlighting the American experience in war.
1^Arthur L. Wagner, The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of 
the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of the American Civil War 
(Leavenworth, Kans.: C. J. Smith & Co., Printers, 1889), p.
1®John Bigelow, Jr., The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated
Mainly from American Campaigns. 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1894)f p. 6.
I^Wagner, The Campaign of Koniggratz, p. 4.
1®Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old 
Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United 
States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 
41.
19wagner, The Campaign of Koniggratz, p. 84.
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Spurred by the advances in American military thought brought
about by Wagner, Bigelow worked in earnest to complete his treatise,
The Principles of Strategy. Although Bigelow shared Wagner's interest
in tactics, he was primarily concerned with defining American military
strategy. He carefully differentiated between tactics and strategy,
aware that they might often conflict with each other:
Tactics is the art of conducting war in the presence of the 
enemy; strategy, the art of conducting it beyond his presence. 
The province of tactics is the field of battle; that of strategy,
the theatre of war, on which, to the strategist, the field of
battle is as a point.20
Moreover, unlike Wagner, Bigelow was preoccupied with the political
motivation for war. He accepted the premise that milit?ry power
should be employed at the behest of political authority. Accordingly,
national policy had to be stated in realistic political goals in order
to translate military power effectively into fighting power.21
Total War
Bigelow recognized the need to delimit military activity by 
carefully defining political objectives. Nonetheless, he did not 
believe the United States Army should necessarily restrict the
military means with which to seek the political objectives.22 He
persisted in viewing an enemy's population as a legitimate target in 
war. War is armed conflict between nations and by that fact itself 
Bigelow envisioned the opposing populations as component parts of the
^Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, pp. 17-18.
21Ibid.
22ibid., p. 228.
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fray. Bigelow did not question the morality of such a doctrine of 
total war. He realized from his study of the Franco-Prusian War and 
his reading of Clausewitz that war was, of its nature, brutal. An 
examination of the military campaigns of General Sherman convinced 
Bigelow of the correctness of his viewpoint. Sherman reconciled the 
brutality of his punitive expeditions during the Civil War and Indian 
campaigns by noting that the survival and safety of the nation 
sanctioned his seemingly extreme measures.23 Bigelow’s recognition of 
the importance of legitimacy in warfare is crucial to understanding 
his concept of total war. He condoned neither wanton destruction nor 
indiscriminate killing but rather called for the full application of 
military power in support of well-defined political aims.
Insight may be gained into Bigelow* s rationale for the 
necessity of waging total war by examining an influential book he 
cites in the bibliography to his text on The Principles of Strategy. 
It is Lieutenant J. M. O'Connor's translation of Baron Simon Francois 
Gay de Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, a 
study that had also influenced Sherman.21* It was a standard text at 
West Point until 1836 and was employed extensively by Dennis Hart 
Mahan. Besides providing an overview of the grand strategy of Jomini 
and the Englishman Henry Lloyd, it presented a theory on the ethics of
23john W. Brinsfield, "The Military Ethics of General William 
T. Sherman: A Reassessment," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War 
College 12 (June 1982):37.
2l*Ibid., p. 38; see also Russell F. Weigley, "American 
Strategy from Its Beginnings Through the First World War," in Peter 
Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 414.
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war. Mahan cited it frequently. He used it to support his opinion 
during the Seminole War in 1836 that the Indians could be defeated if 
their food supply was destroyed.25 The O'Connor text supported 
Mahan's assertion that "there are times in a nation's existence when 
the safety of the State is the highest law."26 Sherman embraced this 
view, as did Bigelow. It helped Bigelow to coalesce his opinions on 
the necessity for total war.
Publication
By 1889 Bigelow was anxious to publish his thoughts. General 
John M. Schofield succeeded Sheridan as commanding general in August 
1888, and Bigelow may have assumed his study of American strategy 
might be afforded some support by his former mentor. The Personal 
Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan were published later in 1888 and Bigelow 
compared it closely with the recollections of Sheridan's 
contemporaries. Bigelow, meanwhile, rejoined the Tenth Cavalry in 
November 1889, after more than two years in Washington.27 His study 
of The Principles of Strategy was near completion, and he turned the 
manuscript over to his brother and father to seek a publisher. In 
1891 the publishing firms of G. P. Putnam's Sons in New York and T. 
Fisher Unwin in London accepted it for publication. It was financed 
in large part by his father.
25Brinsfield, "The Military Ethics of General William T. 
Sherman," p. 37.
26ibid., p. 38.
27cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates 
of the U.S. Military Academy. 1802-1890, 3;285.
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Bigelow had been unhappy with the map illustrations in many 
of the campaign studies he had read during the research for his 
book.2® As a result he took deliberate measures to assure that the 
maps accompanying his text were printed and bound properly.29 The 
result was a text lavishly supported by 32 detailed maps; most folded 
out so that they could be consulted easily while reading the 
narrative.
It was Bigelow's intent to offset the profusion of textbooks 
that detailed the lessons of European warfare and "discuss the subject 
of strategy in the light of American warfare, and thus furnish 
instruction for Americans, not only in the theory of this subject, but 
also in the military history and geography of their own country."30 
In doing so, he performed a valuable service that of itself is 
notable. Nevertheless, although Bigelow did not profess to originality
2®The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 3 December 1884, USMA.
29see, for example, T. Fisher Unwin to Poultney Bigelow, 16 
February 1891, in The Colonel John Bigelow Papers, box 98, series 3, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.
Bigelow succinctly states his concern for proper maps to accompany 
campaign studies in an amusing passage in the preface to his later 
book The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1910), p. xiii: "I have 
tried to provide the reader with such maps as he will need, but am
aware that I have not made his way a royal road. There is no
comfortable way of reading military history. Whoever expects to 
follow a campaign reclining in an easy chair with a book in one hand 
and a ciger in the other is doomed to disappointment." J.P. Wisser, 
review of The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American 
Campaigns. by John Bigelow, Jr., in Journal of the United States
Artillery 3 (July 1894):518, remarked that Bigelow's text is 
"supported with a number of maps sufficient to satisfy the most 
exacting; a supply so generous it is always a pleasure to see in any 
work relating to the art of war."
30Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, p. 6.
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in the strategy he presented, he argued for total war, a mode of
warfare hitherto not incorporated into army doctrine.31 Although
Bigelow wrote that "as a rule, the primary object of military
operations should be to overpower, and, if possible, to capture or
destroy, the hostile army," he argued that the ultimate objective of
offensive military action reached beyond the seizure of enemy
territory and the defeat of the enemy army to the enemy’s population,
which he identified as the decisive objective in war.32 if Bigelow
appeared inconsistent in urging war against civil populations, it was
because he realized that
a design of operations should be based upon the thorough 
knowledge of one's enemy and of his circumstances and condition. 
Such knowledge is acquired only by a systematic study of his 
military institutions; of the political, military, and 
statistical geography, and of the social, political, and 
commercial systems, of his country; and, finally, of his history, 
with special regard to his wars.33
Simple defeat of the enemy army may not be decisive. Bigelow 
quoted von der Goltz who asserted in The Nation in Arms that "no plan 
of operations can with any degree of safety extend beyond the first 
collision with the enemy's main army."3^ Bigelow had learned from his 
study of the Franco-Prussian War that "no plan adopted at the outset 
should be expected to prove altogether feasible after the first
31Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military 
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia Dniversity 
Press, 1962), p. 95.
32Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, p. 263; see also 
Weigley, Towards an American Army, pp. 95-96.
33Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, p. 263.
3^lbid., p. 262.
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general engagement."35 He drew upon American historical examples to 
show that defeat of an army in the field may not lead to peace until 
the will of the people to resist is broken. Menacing or even 
capturing the enemy capital may also be insufficient if the war is 
popular with the people. He had successfully drawn together the 
lessons of American military history and deduced the course of future 
conflict. Nevertheless, he could not escape the limitations of his 
formal military education.
Much of his treatise was pedantic, drawn as it was from the 
works of Jomini and belabored with mathematical and geometric 
equations. Although this pedestrian approach made the text more 
palatable to the army, Bigelow was much more effective when 
integrating history and the concepts of Clausewitz into the text.
This more enlightened approach to military history and strategy 
reached fruition in 1910 in Bigelow’s major contribution to military 
literature, The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical 
Study.
Bigelow's use of geometrical diagrams in The Principles of 
Strategy may be discounted as a straining to reduce strategy to a 
series of scientific equations. It would be a serious mistake to 
account his intent for so little. Bigelow's text is much more
complex. On one hand he clearly intends to capture readers schooled
in the scientific precepts of West Point; but Bigelow disdained this 
fixation on science. He had lamented Upton's failure to be heeded
simply because he was unscientific. Perhaps more basically, Bigelow's
35ibid.
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juxtaposition of geometry with case studies of American campaigns 
highlights the dichotomy of strategy as a science and art.36
Clearly Bigelow believed that there were basic introductory
principles that could be economically explained by geometric figures,
and he freely displayed angles, lines, and curves to illustrate
interior and exterior lines, lines of retreat, lines of supply, bases
of operations, strategic and tactical points, and other basic concepts
or principles. Nevertheless, Bigelow strongly believed strategy to be
an art. He likely concurred in Jomini's assertion:
War in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy,
particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling 
those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war
viewed as a whole.37
This problem of war as an art or science was exhaustively discussed by
Clausewitz. Bigelow was certainly familiar with Clausewitz’s
reasoning. Clausewitz, for example, felt that "the term ’art of war’
is more suitable than 'science of war."' Nevertheless, he believed
that "strictly speaking war is neither an art nor a science."38 As a
result, Bigelow ignored rote principles of war but freely displayed
the principles of strategy, not to guide battlefield activity but
rather to direct historical investigation.
36see, for example, Major Robert A. Doughty, "The Art and
Science of Tactics," Parameters: Journal of the D.S. Army War College 
7 (September 1979):39-^5.
37Antoine Henri de Jomini, Summary of The Art of War, trans. 
Captain G. H. Mendell and Lieutenant W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott 4 Co., 1862; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1968), p. 293.
38carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984),
P. 149.
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Bigelow’s geometric diagrams are intellectual tools intended 
to help analyze and study history. More basically, however, Bigelow 
used the diagrams to define his terms so that army officers could 
better contemplate the campaigns and battles he recounts. Why? He 
realized that the art of war was being increasingly held hostage to 
technology. Therefore, he reluctantly acknowledged the necessity for 
a science of war, of which logistics, personnel mobilization, and 
weapons were necessary to prepare for the art of war. Bigelow 
realized that war was becoming more complex. The Industrial 
Revolution heralded breakthroughs in weaponry; the size of armies was 
expected to increase with the mobilization of civilian volunteers or 
conscripts. All this resulted in a nightmare of logistic requirements. 
A systematic approach was needed to plan for their employment and 
Bigelow believed his principles were pertinent for study.
Bigelow’s study of the Franco-Prussian War had convinced him 
that the art of war must be served by scientific principles for staff 
planning. His analysis of The Principles of Strategy tried to close 
the gap between the art of war on one hand and the science of war on 
the other. Clearly he did not intend his principles to be applied by 
rote on the battlefield. On the contrary, the principles were to be 
used in inductive analyses of military campaigns to discern the art of 
war. Many of his examples stress the vagaries of war and demonstrate 
the inappropriateness of certain principles under certain combat 
conditions. Basically, Bigelow had come to believe that only through 
careful preparation of the battlefield could generals exercise their 
art. Systematic staff preparation was critical before the battle.
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The Significance of The Principles of Strategy
The Principles of Strategy is not a definitive examination of 
the principles of war. Rather, it is a historical review of American 
campaigns and battles that illustrate the course of the military 
policy of the United States since the founding of the nation. Certain 
of the guiding principles of Jomini, Clausewitz, von der Goltz, and 
other military thinkers are explored, but The Principles of Strategy 
is not a simple textbook that should be used as a guide to practical 
action. Although it was of direct interest to soldiers, Bigelow was 
also directing his philosophical comments on the conduct of war to the 
civilian leaders of the nation.
Bigelow had gleaned the principles of strategy from the major 
and minor studies of the art of war. His purpose in presenting his 
text to the U.S. Army and public was not to divine different or new 
principles but simply to illustrate historically tested tenets with 
American examples. In doing so his study was much more original than 
he supposed. In his ambitious and successful attempt to demonstrate 
the basic principles that guide strategy based on the American 
experience, he described a coherent United States military policy of 
total war that had heretofore never been articulated. Nevertheless, 
the pattern Bigelow unfolded was clear and concise, and The Principles 
of Strategy became a concordat for a doctrine of political war.
Bigelow wrote little that was totally new. The Principles of 
Strategy, however, was a plea for modernization and standardization 
for a professional army that had too long been neglected by a
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complacent Congress and populace. Bigelow tried to call national 
attention to the threats to the security of the United States and to 
outline a doctrine of military preparedness. The Principles of 
Strategy was important mainly because Bigelow assembled and laid out 
in orderly fashion the collected experience of the U.S. Army since the 
American Revolution. He did not attempt to hide his debt to others 
and openly identified his sources, and the text is noteworthy for some 
of the divergent works that Bigelow culled for facts.
Bigelow found von der Goltz to be particularly influential.
Bigelow cites von der Goltz frequently throughout The Principles of
Strategy. Bigelow surely heeded the warning von der Goltz presented
in the opening of his treatise The Nation in Arms:
A military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon war, runs 
the risk of being likened to the poet who, after Goethe, attempts 
a Faust, or, after Shakespeare, a Hamlet. Everything of any 
importance to be said about the nature of war can be found 
stereotyped in the works left behind by that greatest of military 
thinkers.39
It may be assumed, therefore, that Bigelow considered his study of war 
somehow unique and of particular significance to warfare and its 
development in the United States.
What influence did Bigelow have on the conduct of war? It is 
difficult to assess such influence or if indeed his principles were 
ever put into practice. However, it is certain that the United States 
Army had no clearly defined nor well-developed tactical nor strategic 
doctrine prior to 1891. It may be that Bigelow's work was of only 
academic merit with no practical military application. Bigelow
39Quoted in Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in 
Clausewitz, On War, p. 31.
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negotiated with T. Fisher Onwin for complimentary copies of the book 
to be sent to prominent military men such as Schofield, Miles, and 
Wesley Merritt, and 200 copies were purchased for the government for 
distribution to post libraries.**0 It may have changed the way army 
officers viewed war, if not the way they fought it.
In his ambitious overview of The Principles of Strategy. 
Bigelow summarized his growing understanding of the art of war. 
Bigelow fully subscribed to the concept that the successful conduct of 
warfare is an art. Inherent in such a belief is his understanding 
that generalship is capable of being developed through study and 
experience.^ He approvingly quoted Sherman's assertion that "there 
may be such men as born generals, but I have never encountered them, 
and I doubt the wisdom of trusting to their turning up in an 
emergency."**2 Bigelow was convinced that warfare must be mastered 
through an acquired appreciation of the basic and immutable principles 
that have been discerned in the successful military campaigns of the 
past. He perceived those principles as the scientific core of war or 
as that portion of generalship which can be acquired by study. 
Bigelow does not identify new principles of war but draws freely from 
the campaigns of Napoleon and the analytical works of Jomini, 
Clausewitz, Halleck, von der Goltz, and other authorities.
^0"A Contract concerning the Publication of a work entitled 
Principles of Strategy entered into by Mr. Poultney Bigelow on behalf 
of the Author of the Work on the one hand, & T. Fisher Onwin, 
Publisher of the said work on the other hand," undated copy March 
1891, box 98, series 3, LC.
^"•Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy, p. 5.
2̂ibid.
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Bigelow knew that scientific or simple mechanical knowledge
of the principles of warfare are insufficient for generalship.
Despite the unchanging character of these essential scientific
principles of strategy, Bigelow emphasized that war is never static.
Bigelow postulated that in war uncertainty is the only constant:
No two armies have exactly the same marching power; no road, 
railroad, or other line of communication is absolutely straight; 
no two such lines are exactly as practical the one as the other. 
Changes in the weather, works of improvement, and acts of 
destruction may effect daily and hourly variations in the 
practicality of a line of communication.^3
Simple scientific knowledge of the principles of war, therefore, must
be bolstered by extensive experience. Bigelow was well aware that a
soldier's opportunities to acquire combat experience were limited,
even during periods of hostilities. Consequently, he recommended the
historical study of war as the only means of gaining the necessary
experience.^ Moreover, he proposed that the historical study of
American wars was particularly remunerative, and he recommended it not
only to professional soldiers but also to civilians "as an essential
part of a liberal education."1̂
Bigelow ascribed to mobile warfare. He disdained set-piece 
battles that waste lives in futile, unthinking frontal assaults. He 
carefully described a strategy based on maneuver.^6 He envisioned all 
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objective. The choice of an objective in support of the eventual 
aim of strategy will dictate the form of war, but it must be marked by 
rapid movement. Bigelow skillfully described Stonewall Jackson’s 
brilliant Shenandoah Talley campaign in 1862 as a classic example of 
maneuver. Jackson was able to achieve tactical superiority in the 
course of several major battles despite being strategically 
outnumbered by a force frequently twice his size. Bigelow’s concise 
sketches illustrated his concept of the basic principles of strategy: 
tactical strategy, the use of maneuver to overmatch the enemy on the 
field of battle; regular strategy designed to deprive the enemy of 
his supplies; and political strategy to embarass the hostile 
government.1*8
Bigelow emphasized that political strategy had been generally 
ignored in the strategic studies prevalent in army schools. He 
reviewed the British operations in the southern states, 1776-81, 
during the American Revolution as a pertinent example. He recounted 
the multiplicity of the British command between Lord Cornwallis in the 
field, Sir Henry Clinton in New York, and Lord Germain, the British 
Secretary of War, in London. Bigelow addressed this ill-fated 
campaign also to demonstrate the importance of unity of command.^9 it 
is mainly, however, a well-told example of how a political strategy of 
a war directed against the people may be misapplied. Through the 
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in the southern states, Bigelow cautioned against a blind application
of his concept of total war:
How far the idea of dispiriting a people may be advantageously 
carried is a function of most uncertain factors. The infliction 
of suffering on a people who can stand all that can be inflicted 
only makes the military problem more difficult by embittering 
them, and so the infliction of inadequate suffering is a cruel 
mistake.50
Bigelow believes victory must be accomplished mainly through the wise 
employment of maneuver inherent in tactical strategy, designed to 
outnumber the enemy in battle. Regular strategy or depriving the 
enemy of supplies and political strategy cannot carry the war alone.51
Bigelow did not envision war as a science. Nevertheless, he 
asserted his strategic thought through basic principles and Jomini’s 
geometric projections. It was an expedient in deference to the 
military vernacular of the day. Additionally, however, these 
fundamental principles allowed Bigelow systematically to formulate a 
unique American doctrine of war. Perhaps most importantly, Bigelow’s 
careful analysis of the history of America’s wars and his generous use 
of graphic examples demonstrated a profound evolution of American 
military thought. He showed that America’s experience in war 
indicated that wars could not be won simply by trying to engage the 
enemy in a decisive battle. Not only was it too costly in terms of 
life and property, but also war had become much more complex. History 
demonstrated how technology had altered the nature of war. It 
followed in Bigelow’s view, that similar changes in how nations waged
50ibid., p. 232.
51lbid.
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war were warranted. To Bigelow these changes indicated total war in 
which the object was to attack not only the enemy army but also the 
enemy population.
It was a strategy designed to break the will of the enemy in 
a most expeditious manner. The goal was to inflict maximum punishment 
on the enemy, while enduring the least possible loss of life and 
property to one's own side. Bigelow's strategy of total war aimed at 
the destruction of enemy morale in lieu of the physical annihilation 
of opposing armies. Although he claimed no originality in his views, 
his synthesis of historical lessons clearly produced a unique 
strategic outlook. Much of his perspective should be attributed to 
the influence of Sherman, but he stamped his own mark on the future of 
war with the publication of The Principle of Strategy.
Bigelow realized the army had no doctrine nor concept of 
action for future wars. He also understood that without a proper 
focus for professional development, there would be few officers 
prepared to fight effectively in the event of hostilities. Therefore, 
based on historical precedent, he articulated a flexible concept of 
total war that he believed was applicable to the future. 
Interestingly, Bigelow feared that the army was becoming too 
scientific. Technological advances in firepower and mobility had led 
some thinkers to believe that once careful preparations were made the 
generalship was complete. On the contrary, despite the critical 
importance of the scientific preparation of the battlefield, Bigelow 
understood that the art of war still prevailed and that good generals 
must be prepared to meet the unexpected and contend with the constant
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friction of battle. In many respects, Bigelow had carefully blended 
the strategic concepts of Jomini and Clausewitz into an original 
construct of his own.
Bigelow is an excellent example of how developments within 
the military sector of society can accurately reflect the developments 
in society as a whole. His concern for the professional development 
and reform of the army grew from a general awareness of military 
factors that affected all sectors of society, not from an isolated 
perspective blinded to all but selfish military needs. His career 
belies the intellectual gap that some historians perceive between the 
military and civil sectors during the latter portion of the nineteenth 
century. Although many men shaped the doctrine, strategy, and 
development of the United States Army, few have been as overlooked or 
forgotten as John Bigelow, Jr.
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CONCLUSION
Historical Significance of John Bigelow, Jr.
Few military historians acknowledge Bigelow at all, much less 
assign to him any noteworthy significance to the development of the 
American army, the advancement of military thought, or the evolution 
of strategic military doctrine. William Addleman Ganoe's pioneer 
study of The History of the United States Army, first published in 
1924, provided a bibliographical listing of several of Bigelow’s major 
publications, but ignored his influence on the army in traditional 
deference to Dennis Hart Mahan, Emory Upton, Arthur L. Wagner, and 
Eben Swift, among others. A succession of complementary military 
histories further obscured Bigelow. Important in his day, Bigelow has 
become a forgotten historical figure. One can search many military 
histories of the concerned period, vainly perusing for a critical 
assessment or even mention of Bigelow. Few military historians 
interested in this period of American military history are likely to 
resurface Bigelow.
Nevertheless, Bigelow is regaining some appreciation largely 
due to the work of Weigley but also on the basis of a U.S. Military 
Academy reprint of Bigelow’s The Principles of Strategy in 1968 in the 
West Point Military Library serie?. The editors of this series have
90
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selected books and journals of "outstanding interest and significance 
in military history," giving special consideration to "works which 
have shaped American military thinking."1 Little most military 
historians have uncovered support the editor's choice. A consensus, 
perhaps, would rate him a historical curiosity among the litany of 
military luminaries who have been studied in detail. A perfunctory 
dismissal of the unique significance John Bigelow, Jr., had on 
American military thought fails adequately to assess the state of the 
study of war in the United States prior to the turn of the century. 
American military officers drew satisfaction from an intellectual 
study of tactics and the special knowledge and attributes which set 
them apart from civilians. Moreover, their knowledge of tactics was 
drawn from the examination of European wars. Bigelow turned
professional military attention to the study of American campaigns, 
and by examining strategy he identified the unique strain of American 
warfare. Weigley states that Bigelow's study of The Principles of 
Strategy was the only "American book-length study of strategy worthy
of mention" published between the end of the Civil War and the
beginning of the First World War.2
"'John Bigelow, Jr., The Principles of Strategy; Illustrated 
Mainly from American Campaigns. 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1894; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 
p. iii.
^Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings 
through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 439. Edward M. Coffman, The Old 
Army: A Portrait of the American Army, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 285-86 indicates also that Bigelow's 
publication of The Principles of Strategy was notable and compares him
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Weigley provides the main impetus for a re-examination of the 
significance of Bigelow. His excellent examination of the History of 
the United States Army, published in 1967, is the first useful 
successor to Ganoe’s study. Weigley inserts the phrase "the 
remarkable John Bigelow" between a short discussion of Emory Upton and 
Arthur L. Wagner. It appears Weigley thinks Bigelow has some 
significance, but the text offers little clue as to why he thinks so. 
It is Weigley’s earlier study of American attitudes toward war, Toward 
an American Army, published in 1962, that provides a comprehensive 
portrait of Bigelow’s apparent merit. Only Timothy K. Nenninger, The 
Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, published in 1978, and Edward M. 
Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 
1784-1898, published in 1986, appear to have continued Weigley’s 
analysis. Weigley, however, has raised the issue of Bigelow once more 
in a thoughful analysis of "American Strategy from Its Beginnings 
Through the First World War" in Peter Paret’s new edition of Makers of 
Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, published in 
1986.
Military Influence of John Bigelow, Jr.
Did the publication of The Principles of Strategy exert 
influence on the army? Yes. John Gooch, in a review of Paret's 
Makers of Modern Strategy, says there has "been an identifiable 
American way in warfare that involves using large amounts of materiel 
to overwhelm the enemy power." He acknowledges, however, that "great
favorably with Wagner and Bourke. Although Coffman has worked with 
Bigelow’s diaries, his assessment appears based on Weigley1s analysis.
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thinkers do not appear to have had very much of a hand in its
creation."3 Bigelow, however, sucessfully culled America’s experience
in war to identify and describe this distinctly American predilection.
Weigley suggests that "with no influential American strategic thinkers
presenting a persuasive contrary view,” it was Bigelow's lucid
description of "a strategy based on Grant's in Virginia that shaped
the American military participation in the First World War."11 Weigley
summarizes Bigelow’s proper standing in American military thought in a
telling bibliographical essay appended to his contribution on American
strategy to Makers of Modern Strategy;
Such systematic strategic writing as there was in the United 
States in the nineteenth century exists mainly in three books: 
Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science . . . 
(New York and Philadelphia, 1846), which appeared in a third 
edition, with critical notes on the Mexican and Crimean Wars (New 
York and London, 1862); Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise 
on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of 
Troops . . . (New York, 1847; rev. ed., New York, 1864), which 
offers brief considerations of strategy despite the heavily 
tactical emphasis implied by the title; and Captain John Bigelow, 
The Principles of Strategy Illustrated Mainly from American 
Campaigns (New York and London, 1891; 2d ed., rev. and enl., 
Philadelphia, 1894; repr. New York, 1968).5
Can this influence of Bigelow be adequately measured? No. 
Nevertheless, Bigelow's campaign study of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte 
was widely distributed by the Ordnance Department in 1884 and it made
3john Gooch, review of Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, in the New York 
Times, 13 April 1986, Book Review section, p. 34.
^Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the 
First World War," p. 440.
5lbid., p. 902. It should be noted that Bigelow was a First 
Lieutenant when The Principles of Strategy was initially published in 
1891.
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him fairly well-known within the army by the time The Principles of 
Strategy was first published in 1891. His journal article, "After 
Geronimo," serially published in Outing Magazine during the period 
March 1886 to April 1887, also gained him a wide audience and 
introduced his name to civilian readers interested in military
affairs. He was not unknown, then, when his quarto volume on The 
Principles of Strategy was released and reviewed in most of the major
military journals and the New York Times. All of the reviews were
generally favorable, and the printing of a second, revised and
enlarged edition must attest to some widespread interest and 
influence.
John Bigelow, Jr., and Army Professionalism 
Bigelow was satisfied that the professional study of the 
American experience in war was fruitful for a fuller understanding of 
the conduct of war and the principles that guide good generalship. 
His earlier study of the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870-71, however, convinced him that warfare was an ever-changing 
phenomenon constantly subjected to the vicissitudes of technology and 
other developments. He realized that to be successful in war the 
United States Army could not depend upon experience gained in the 
Indian Wars to find generals for a major conventional conflict. His 
study of The Principles of Strategy, therefore, was not a tome to 
immutable principles of war, but rather a systematic guide to study 
and analyze military history and learn what precipitated the actions 
of the opposing generals. This vicarious experience could be applied 
by junior officers to other campaign studies, field training, map
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
exercises, or routine training in order to better develop 
professionalism in the army.
Bigelow never intended his book to be a practical guide to 
action. He believed war was conducted in a dynamic environment that 
frequently demanded unconventional responses. On the other hand, he 
also believed a static framework or series of principles was required 
to better evaluate and study the history of wars and campaigns. This 
dichotomy was expressed in a title he contemplated for his study—  
"Abstract War, illustrated by Concrete."6 Although Bigelow finally 
entitled his consideration of American military affairs The Principles 
of Strategy, he did not enumerate a prescriptive list of actions to 
guide soldiers in combat. The principles of war usually associated 
with Jomini are often listed simply as objective, offensive, mass, 
economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, cooperation, security, 
surprise, and simplicity. Bigelow certainly discussed many of these 
concepts in his examination of American strategy, but he used them to 
evaluate historical examples. He did not generalize the American 
experience in war to discern principles of military conduct. Bigelow 
believed Grant's remark in his Personal Memoirs that "if men make war 
in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail."7
A shortcoming of Bigelow's exposition and understanding of 
the art of war was his apparent disregard of naval warfare. This may 
be the product of ignorance or design. Clearly his interest was in
^The Diaries of John Bigelow, Jr., 10 July 1884, John 
Bigelow, Jr., Papers, United States Military Academy Library.
^Quoted in John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and 
Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 22.
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land warfare, and his study of the Franeo-Prussian War could do little 
to further stir his interest in the navy. Bigelow was certainly 
familiar with the seminal work of Alfred Thayer Mahan. He cited Mahan 
in the bibliography to The Principles of Strategy, and his brother, 
Poultney Bigelow, was a friend and admirer of Mahan. Bigelow may 
simply have confined his thought to war on land, not wishing to risk a 
superficial, cursory review of naval warfare in the aftermath of 
Mahan’s exhaustive treatise. The paucity of his discussion of naval 
activity might also be attributable to the limited American examples.
John Bigelow, Jr., and American Military Strategy 
Most of Bigelow’s contemporaries were concerned with 
utilitarian aspects of tactics to improve the soldier's skills. 
Bigelow viewed war, however, on a more complex level. He examined 
strategy and believed that effective applications of military force 
must be guided by a political purpose or objective. He described 
three forms of strategy in his study of The Principles of Strategy: 
tactical, regular, and political. He fully appreciated the importance 
of chance in warfare and as a result could not ascribe to one form of 
strategy over another. Although he recognized the importance of 
political strategy, taking the war to the people, the forms of 
strategy might be applied in consonance or any one might take 
precedence depending on the circumstances. Although Bigelow described 
his strategies in terms of maneuver, he never believed war could be 
won by maneuver in lieu of battle. He recognized limited ends but did 
not limit military effort. He codified the Sherman ethic in American 
military strategy.
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Although after his retirement from active service Bigelow 
devoted a great deal of time to geography, the history of discoveries, 
and languages, he continued his interest in military strategy. He 
published much commentary in the press, magazines, and journals. He 
published studies on American Policy: The Western Hemisphere in its 
Relations to the Eastern in 1914; Breeches of Anglo-American 
Treaties; A Study in History and Diplomacy in 1917; and World Peace: 
How War Cannot Be Abolished; How it May Be Abolished also in 1917. He 
also compiled volumes 4 and 5 to his father’s Retrospections of an 
Active Life from material entrusted to him after his father’s death.
Summary
His major measure of merit, however, was as a military 
historian and strategist. He had a substantial influence on doctrine 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He wrote 
with an awareness that military preparedness cannot be assured simply 
by correcting the mistakes of the last war. The lessons inherent in 
the historical evolution of strategy must be projected correctly to 
assess the dynamics of future battle. Bigelow understood the wanton 
destructiveness technology could impose on war and developed 
strategies to limit war. His significance must be measured in light 
of broad, representative contributions to military theory and history. 
Bigelow was particularly noteworthy and displayed a profound 
intellectual awareness of the problems of war. He had a favorable 
impact on the advancement of military thought, not only for the 
espousal of any one theory or doctrine, but rather for the aggregate 
efforts of his career. He was not always correct, and much of what he
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had proposed did not weather well. Nevertheless, his influence upon 
the American military was pronounced.
True, Bigelow is probably the most overlooked of America’s 
military critics, historians, and strategists who tried to cope with 
the technological, organizational, and doctrinal changes occurring in 
warfare during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Nevertheless, his original ideas and studies on strategy exerted 
considerable influence in the United States and Europe, although his 
contribution to the study and development of military history and 
strategy are rarely acknowledged.
That he has been overlooked cannot detract from his merit. 
As late as 1910 he demonstrated the futility and foolishness of the 
infantry frontal assault in his classic Civil War campaign study, The 
Campaign of Chancellorsville. Few generals of the opposing armies of 
the First World War displayed a useful awareness of this historical 
lesson. A misreading of Clausewitz led many of these battlefield 
commanders to endure disproportionately heavy losses in an attempt to 
mass superior forces at a decisive position. Bigelow appreciated the 
need for mobility in warfare, the skillful use of the defense, and the 
overriding influence of political policy.




U.S. Department of War. General Orders. Washington, D.C.: Adjutant
General's Office, 1877-1924.
U.S. Department of War. Official Army Register. Washington, D.C.: 
Adjutant General's Office, 1878-1937.
U.S. Department of War. List of Military Posts, Etc.. Established
in the United States from Its Earliest Settlement to the
Present Time. Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1902.
U.S. Department of War. Special Orders. Washington, D.C.: Adjutant
General's Office, 1877-1889.
U.S. Military Academy, Headquarters. Official Register of the 
Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy. West 
Point, N.Y., June, 1877, June 30, 1877.
Diaries, Letters, and Memoirs
Bigelow, John. Retrospections of an Active Life. 5 vols. New
York: Baker & Taylor Co., vols. 1-3, 1909, and Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., vols. 4-5, edited by John
Bigelow, Jr., 1913.
Bigelow, John, Jr. On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. Forward,
Introduction, and Notes by Arthur Woodard. Los Angeles: 
Westernlore Press, 1968.
Bigelow, Poultney. Seventy Summers. 2 vols. New York: Longman's, 
Green & Co., 1925.
________ . Prussian Memories: 1864-1914. New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1915.
New York Public Library. Rare Books and Manuscripts Division. The 
Papers of John Bigelow.
99
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
United States Military Academy Library. John Bigelow, Jr., Papers.
Washington, D.C. Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. The 
Colonel John Bigelow Papers.
Books, General and Reference
Bigelow, John, Jr. Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1884.
________ . The Principles of Strategy; Illustrated Mainly from
American Campaigns, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 
Co., 1894.
________ . The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from
American Campaigns, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 
Co., 1894; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
________ . The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and
Tactical Study. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1910.
The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point.
New York. 1802-1902. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1S04.
Clapp, Margaret. Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow. Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1947.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and Translated by Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret. Introductory essays by Peter 
Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie. Commentary by 
Bernard Brodie. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1984.
Cullum, Major General George W. Biographical Register of the
Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, at 
West Point, N.Y. from its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890:
With the Early History of the United States Military 
Academy. 3rd ed. 3 vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin &
Co., 1891.
Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register and Dictionary of the
United States Army. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1903.
Holden, Edward S., ed. Biographical Register of the Officers and 
Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New 
York Since its Establishment in 1802, by Major General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
George W. Cullum. Supplement, vol. 4: 1890-1900. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1901.
Jomini, Antoine Henri de. Summary of The Art of War. Translated by 
Captain G. H. Mendell and Lieutenant W. P. Craighill. 
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 4 Co., 1862; reprint ed.,
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968.
National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. 35. Clifton, N.J.: 
James T. White 4 Co., 1949.
Robinson, Wirt, ed. Biographical Register of the Officers and
Graduates of the O.S. Military Academy at West Point. New 
York Since its Establishment in 1802, by Major General 
George W. Cullum. Supplement, vol. 5: 1910-1920.
Saginaw, Mich.: Seemann 4 Peters, Printers, 1920.
Book Chapters and Journal Articles
American Historical Review 41 (April 1936):607. S.v. "Obituary: 
Bigelow."
Bigelow, John, Jr. "The Sabre and Bayonet Question." Journal of 
the Military Service Institution of the United States 3 
(January-March 1882):65-96.
________ . "The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry." In Blacks in the United
States Armed Forces: Basic Documents. Vol. 3: Freedom and 
Jim Crow, 1865-1917, pp. 29-86. Edited by Morris J. 
MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty. Wilmington, Del.: 
Scholarly Resources, 1977.
________ . "Tenth Regiment of Cavalry." Journal of the Military
Service Institution 13 (January 1892):215-2U.
Brackett, Colonel Albert G. "Our Cavalry: Its Duties, Hardships, 
and Necessities, at Our Frontier Posts." Journal of the 
Military Service Institution of the United States 4 
(September 1883):383-407.
Gates, John M. "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the 
Late 19th Century." Parameters: Journal of the O.S. Army 
War College 10 (September 1980):32-45.
Swift, Eben. Review of The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A 
Strategic and Tactical Study, by John Bigelow, Jr.
American Historical Review 16 (January 1911):367-68.
Wisser, J. P. Review of The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated
Mainly from American Campaigns, by John Bigelow, Jr.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
Journal of the United States Artillery 3 (July 1894):517— 
19.
Newspaper Articles and Pamphlets 
Army and Navy Journal. 1884-93.
New York Times. 1 March 1936, sec. 2, p. 10.
Sixty-Seventh Annual Report of the Association of Graduates of the 
United States Military Academy at West Point. New York. 
June 11. 1936. Newburg, N.Y.: Moore Publishing Co., 1936.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Memoirs
Bourke, John 6. On the Border with Crook. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1891; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1971.
________ . An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre: An Account of the
Expedition in Pursuit of the Hostile Chiricahua Apaches in 
the Spring of 1883. Introduction by J. Frank Dobie. New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891; reprint ed., New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958.
Boyd, Mrs. Orsemus B. Cavalry Life in Tent and Field. New York:
J. S. Tait, 1894; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982.
Davis, Britton. The Truth About Geronimo. Edited by M. M. Quaife. 
Forward by Robert M. Utley. New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1929; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1976.
Hein, 0. L. Memories of Long Ago by an Old Army Officer. New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925.
King, Charles. Campaigning with Crook. Introduction by Don
Russell. New York: Harper & Bros., 1890; reprint ed., 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964.
Miles, Nelson A. Serving the Republic: Memoirs of the Civil and
Military Life of Nelson A. Miles. New York: Harper & Bros.
Publishers, 1911.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Schofield, Lieutenant General John M. Forty-Six Years in the Army. 
New York: Century Co., 1897.
Books, General and Reference
Bernardo, C. Joseph, and Bacon, Eugene H. American Military Policy: 
Its Development Since 1775. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole 
Co., 1955.
Bigelow, John, Jr. Modern Language Notes: French. Boston: A. D. 
Maelachlan, 1906.
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Carroll, John M., ed. The Black Military Experience in the American 
West. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1971.
Cashin, Herschel V.; Alexander, C.; Anderson, W. T.; Brown, A. M.;
Birins, H. W. Under Fire with the Tenth U.S. Cavalry: Being 
a Brief, Comprehensive Review of the Negro's Participation 
in the Wars of the United States. Introduction by Major 
General Joseph Wheeler. New York: F. Tennyson Neely, 1899; 
reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969.
Collins, John M. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practice. Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973.
Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1955.
Dunlay, Thomas W. Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and 
Auxilaries with the United States Army, 1860-90. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
Faulk, Odie B. The Geronimo Campaign. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969.
Fleming, Thomas J . West Point: The Men and Times of the United
States Military Academy. New York: William Morrow A Co., 
1969.
Ganoe, William Addleman. The History of the United States Army. D.
Appleton-Century Co., 1942; reprint ed., Ashton, Md.: Eric 
Lundberg, 1964.
Glass, Major E. L. N., ed. The History of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866— 
1921. Introduction by John M. Carroll. Tucson: Acme 
Printing Co., 1921; reprint ed., Ft. Collins, Colo.: Old 
Army Press, 1972.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and 
Administration. 1900-1963. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1975.
Higham, Robin, ed. A Guide to the Sources of United States Military 
History. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975.
Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of 
France. 1870-1871. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968.
________ . War in European History. London: Oxford University
Press, 1976.
________ . Clausewitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1957.
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait. New York: Free Press, 1960.
Jessup, John E., Jr., and Coakley, Robert W., eds. A Guide to the 
Study and Use of Military History. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1979.
Johnson, Virginia Weisel. The Unregimented General: A Biography of 
Nelson A. Miles. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962.
Karsten, Peter, ed. The Military in America: From the Colonial Era 
to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1980.
King, Charles. Trials of a Staff Officer. Philadelphia: L. R.
Hamersly & Co., 1891.
Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1957.
Leckie, William H. The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro 
Cavalry in the West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1967.
Lewis, Lloyd. Sherman: Fighting Prophet. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& Co., 1932.
Millis, Walter. Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History. 
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956.
Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: 
Education. Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the 
United States Army. 1881-1918. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1978.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Nevins, Allan; Robertson, James I.; and Wiley, Bell I., eds. Civil 
War Books; A Critical Bibliography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1967.
Osgood, Robert Endicott. Limited War: The Challenge to American 
Strategy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1986.
Rickey, Don, Jr. Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted 
Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1963-
Shy, John. A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military 
Struggle for American Independence. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976.
Spiller, Roger J., ed. Dictionary of American Military Biography.
Associate ed. Joseph G. Dawson III, consulting ed. T. Harry 
Williams. 3 vols. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984.
Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the 
Indian. 1866-1891. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
1973.
________ . The Indian Frontier of the American West. 1846-1890.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
Wagner, Arthur L. The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of the
Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of the American Civil 
War. Leavenworth, Kans.: C. J. Smith & Co., Printers, 1889
Weigley, Russell F. Towards an American Army: Military Thought from 
Washington to Marshall. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962.
________ . History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., 1967.
________ . The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1973-
Williams, T. Harry. Americans at War: The Development of the
American Military System. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1960.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
Book Chapters and Journal Articles
Bartlett, Richard A. "The Army, Conservation, and Ecology: The
National Park Assignment." In The United States Army in 
Peacetime: Essays in Honor of the Bicentennial. 1775-1975, 
pp. 41-59. Edited by Robin Higham and Carol Brandt. 
Manhattan, Kans.: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian
Publishing, 1975.
Brinsfield, John W. "The Military Ethics of General William T.
Sherman: A Reassessment." Parameters: Journal of the U.S. 
Army War College 12 (June 1982):36-48.
Clum, John P. "Geronimo." Arizona Historical Review 1 (January 
1929):8-49,
Coffman, Edward M. "Army Life on the Frontier." Military Affairs: 
Journal of the American Military Institute 20 (Winter 
1956):193-201.
Doughty, Major Robert A. "The Art and Science of Tactics."
Parameters: Journal of the O.S. Army War College 7 
(September 1979):39-45.
Gale, Jack C. "Lebo in Pursuit." Journal of Arizona History 21 
(Spring 1980):11-24.
Harte, John Bret. Review of On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. by 
John Bigelow, Jr. The Journal of Arizona History 10 
(Summer 1969):135-36.
Holborn, Hajo. "Moltke’s Strategical Concepts." Military Affairs: 
Journal of the American Military Institute 6 (Fall 
1942):153-68.
Hansen, Joseph Mills. "The Historical Section, Army War College."
The Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1 
(Summer 1937):70-74.
Lane, Jack C. Introduction to Chasing Geronimo: The Journal of
Leonard Wood. May-September. 1886. Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 1970.
Moore, Byron C. Review of On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo. by John 
Bigelow, Jr. Arizona and the West: A Quarterly Journal of 
History 1 (Spring 1959):94-95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
Moore, Jamie W. "National Security in the American Army's
Definition of Mission, 1865-1914." Military Affairs 46 
(October 1982):127-31.
Vandiver, Frank E. Forward to Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at 
Petersburg, by Richard J. Sommers. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Co., 1981.
Waite, Lieutenat H. L. H. "Packs and Packing." Journal of the United 
States Cavalry Association 13 (October 1902):175-79.
Walker, Wallace E. "Emory Dpton and the Army Officer's Creed." 
Military Review 61 (April 1981):65-68.
Weigley, Russell F. "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield." 
Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military 
Institute 23 (Summer 1959):77-84.
Pamphlets
Coffman, Edward M. The Young Officer in the Old Army. The Harmon 
Memorial Lectures in Military History, no. 18. Colorado 
Springs: United States Air Force Academy, 1976.
Tate, James P., ed. The American Military on the Frontier. The
Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United 
States Air Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978.
Utley, Robert M. Indian. Soldier, and Settler: Experiences in the 
Struggle for the American West. St. Louis: Jefferson 
National Expansion Historical Association, 1979.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
